Following Administrator O'Keefe's statement, all members will be recognized for four minutes to ask questions. We will alternate between senators and House members for questions, which is the normal procedure in joint hearings of this nature.

On February 1st, the nation suffered a devastating loss. As the Space Shuttle Columbia descended from orbit, it broke apart. Debris from the accident is still being collected by government agencies and volunteers, with the hope that this evidence will help determine the cause of the accident.

The space shuttle crew was a remarkable team of professionals. They were and will always be role models for all Americans.

Their dedicated service and sacrifice to promote scientific research, not only for our country, but for the world, will never be forgotten. They paid the ultimate price in pursuit of not only their dreams, but the dreams of nations. For that, we will be forever grateful.

As we look to the future of the space program, we can pay tribute to our fallen heroes by diligently carrying out our responsibilities as legislators. In today's hearing, we hope to examine what went wrong on February 1st, the status of the investigation and how we can ensure that an accident like this will never happen again.

This will be the first of a series of hearings on NASA and our space program. While today we're focusing on the Columbia, the accident also has focused our attention on the broader policy issues that perhaps we have neglected for too long.

At subsequent hearings, we will address the role of manned and unmanned space exploration, the costs and benefits of continuing the shuttle program and our investment in the International Space Station and the effectiveness of NASA management. More fundamentally, we must examine the goals of our space program. I firmly believe that man's space exploration should continue; its nature, however, should be and will be examined.

We also must examine the extent to which Congress and the administration may have neglected the shuttle's safety program. A comprehensive examination necessitates a review of our own actions and those of the administration to determine if the shuttle program was underfunded or managed in a manner that compromised safety.

I applaud Administrator Sean O'Keefe and NASA for their openness and availability. This has been an extraordinarily trying time for everyone in the agency.

The administrator and other officials have conducted themselves in a manner worthy of an agency that is not only a national brain trust, but is entrusted with realizing the dreams of all humanity. Many have noted the vast improvement of the release of information, as compared to the Challenger tragedy of 1986.
I'd like to assure the families of the brave men and women who died aboard the Columbia and the dedicated employees of NASA that we will do everything in our power to identify the cause of this tragedy and remedy it. I thank Administrator O'Keefe for appearing before us today. And I look forward to the testimony.

BOEHLERT: We usually open hearings by talking about what a pleasure it is to be here today. But of course, that is not the case. I am reminded of what Lyndon Johnson said when he appeared before Congress after the Kennedy assassination. He said, ``All I have, I gladly would have given not to be standing before you today.''

I'm sure that is the way we all feel, with the tragic loss of the Columbia crew so fresh in our minds and in our hearts. But we owe it to those astronauts and their families and to the American public to work as hard as humanly possible to determine the cause of the shuttle's breakup and to rigorously pursue all of the policy questions the accident brings to a head.

I view this hearing as the start of a very long conversation we will all be having about the Columbia incident and its ramifications.

I think that it's very appropriate that we start that conversation on a bicameral basis. And I want to thank Senator McCain for being so willing to make this a joint hearing. The House and the Senate and NASA are going to have to cooperate as we each review the accident and the Human Space Flight program. And our joint work today should send a clear signal that we can and will do just that.

We will also all be coordinating with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, headed by Admiral Gehman. I've spoken to Admiral Gehman. And I am impressed with the admiral's determination to be independent and deliberate, vowing to be swayed neither by outside pressures or artificial deadlines. And I appreciate the swiftness with which Administrator O'Keefe activated the board.

That said, the more I've read the board's charter, the more I've become convinced that it must be rewritten. The words of the charter simply do not guarantee the independence and latitude that both the administrator and the admiral have sincerely promised. The charter's words need to match everyone's intent now to avoid any problems later.

I also continue to believe that several more members should be added to the board to ensure that it has the appropriate breadth of experience and expertise. We will be working closely with the board as the Science Committee proceeds with its own bipartisan investigation, which will focus on the many policy questions raised by the accident. We are going to have to raise some tough and basic questions that have gone unanswered for too long:

What are the true risks of flying the shuttle, especially if it is going to remain in service for another 10 to 15 years? What are the true costs of continuing the shuttle program at specific levels of risk? And what are the advantages of investing in the shuttle, as compared to investing in other NASA programs, other R&D programs and, indeed, other government programs, in general?

But we can't begin to deal with those overarching issues until we have a better sense of what happened to the Columbia and why. And it's obviously too soon to expect to know that.

No one should expect any revelations at today's hearing. We are here today to get a status report.

We ought to avoid pronouncements today that we may later come to regret. I'm reminded of an interview I once read with an executive of the utility that owned Three Mile Island at the time of the accident there. He was asked, ``What was the worst thing you did in handling the accident?''

He answered immediately. He said, ``We just didn't have the presence of mind to say, 'I don't know.''' I would advise Administrator O'Keefe, who has responded magnificently in this time of crisis: don't hesitate to say, ``I don't know.'' You're still in search of elusive answers.

Despite the best of intentions, NASA has, at times, already put out misleading information because it didn't check the facts. For example, information indicating that environmental rules could have contributed to the accident has so far turned out to be entirely spurious.

But it's taken NASA a long time to clarify its statements. Today is a chance to put facts into the record-facts that will help chart NASA's future.

If we are to find the facts and honor the memory of the Columbia crew, we have to approach our task in a true spirit of exploration-with open and probing minds, without preconceived notions or foregone conclusions. That should be our goal today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MCCAIN: Senator Hollings?

HOLLINGS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this meeting. We welcome our colleagues from the House side, as well as my old friend, Administrator O'Keefe. We're glad to have you with us.

Chairman Boehlert, I got the message: let's don't jump to conclusions. On the other hand, I'm reading in the morning paper the similar message--that on the other hand, rather. Admiral Gehman said that the investigation with solid evidence thus far hard to come by.

On the contrary, we have a lot of solid evidence that we have come by. And I sort of discern some kind of eerie avoidance here of what really happened. Here are the hard evidence:

NASA has had a long history of problems with the shuttle heat tiles. We know that the Columbia's very first mission, the tiles all flew off. That's 22 years ago.
In 1994, a study entitled, ``The Risk Management for the Tiles of the Space Shuttle,'' by Stanford and Carnegie Mellon, found that 15 percent of the shuttle's tiles account for 85 percent of the risk. And that was confirmed by a 1997 study by the National Academy of Sciences. And a study by the Johnson Space Center itself, in March of 2000, found that the leading edges of the wing--quote--''pose the highest risk for critical failure.'' End quote.

And then, during the launch of the Columbia on January the 16th, we have evidence of debris striking the shuttle orbiter 81 seconds after launch, causing a gash in the left wing of some 30 inches long, seven inches wide and over 2.5 inches thick. And then, 18 minutes from landing, the shuttle was pitching and yawning due to the drag on the left wing.

And, of course, this morning's paper says that, as it was coming down--and I'm quoting a mission control--''FYI, for your information, I have just lost four separate temperature transducers on the left side of the vehicle, hydraulic return temperatures,'' he calmly reported. And then, 18 minutes from the landing, the shuttle was pitching and yawning, due to drag on the left wing.

And then, again quoting, ``Eight minutes before all communication was lost, Mr. Kling noticed the loss of data from temperature gauges on the left wing on the spacecraft, as he monitored the shuttle's descent into the atmosphere. A few moments later, Mr. Kling reported drag on the spaceship, but Control has expressed no alarm.''

And finally, the elevons--the picture showed the elevons tried to counteract that drag in engine thrusters to help it gain control. It was a minute before the explosion, the U.S. Air Force captured that picture of the shuttle, showing a bulge of deformity along the front edge of the left wing.

Right on down the list. Mr. Administrator, I would think in the testimony, we all agree we don't want to jump to conclusions. We all agree we want to be very thorough and leave no stone unturned. But we do have a rebuttable presumption here, that the damage to the left wing at the time of liftoff was the cause.
And let's rebut it. Let's find something. But don't all of a sudden be discovering debris all around and all of these other things. I've been in these investigations before. And we knew exactly what happened, at the Challenger.

Alan McDonald (ph) said he was in the control room. They had warned not to take it off, that it was going to cause a catastrophe.

And he said one gentleman said, ``There she goes.'' Another one said, ``Like a piece of cake.'' And then, he said, it exploded. And everyone in the room knew why. And then we spent years investigating to find out the same thing that we knew immediately at the time of explosion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MCCAIN: Thank you, Senator Hollings.

Congressman Hall hasn't arrived yet. So we will proceed to Mr. O'Keefe, the administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. He is accompanied by Mr. Frederick D. Gregory, who is the deputy administrator, and Mr. William Readdy, the associate administrator for space flight. If you would like to join--or they may remain where they are.

And again, I want to thank you for the extreme willingness on your part to share all information that you have with not only members of Congress, but with the American people.

Please proceed, Mr. O'Keefe. And I hope you understand that we are interested in as thorough a briefing as possible, as are Americans who are viewing this hearing today.

Thank you.

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Boehlert.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee and the House Science Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics to discuss the tragic loss of the courageous crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia . . .

MCCAIN: Could you pull the microphone a little closer?

O'KEEFE: . . . the on-going investigation into this tragedy, and the implications of the loss of Columbia to the nation's space exploration efforts.

This morning, 11 days after the accident, our work continues to honor the solemn pledge we've made to the astronauts' families and to the American people that we will find out what caused the loss of Columbia and its crew, correct what problems we find and do our utmost to make sure this never happens again.
We welcome the joint committee's interest in working with NASA to determine how we can learn from this tragic accident so that we may continue advancing the nation's research and exploration objectives in space, while at the same time striving to ensure that we make human space flight as safe as possible.

Throughout NASA's 45 years of serving the public interest, Congress has been our partner, helping us achieve the goals outlined in NASA's congressionally authorized charter. This charter compels NASA to: explore, use and enable the development of space for human enterprise; advance scientific knowledge and understanding of the Earth, the solar system and the universe and use the environment of space for research; research, develop, verify and transfer advanced aeronautics, space and related technologies.

With the support of Congress, NASA has amassed a record of significant achievements that have tangibly improved the lives of all Americans. And when we have erred, you have helped us right our course.

This morning, you will be asking tough questions. And that's as it should be. Believe me, none of the questions you will ask can be any tougher than those we are asking of ourselves.

I can assure you, however, that whatever determinations are reached regarding the cause of the accident, you will find that complacency is not one of them. And ethos of safety is evidence throughout the agency.

For example, last year we temporarily halted shuttle flight operations when tiny cracks of less than two inches were discovered in metal liners used to direct the fuel flow inside the propellant lines on two separate orbiters. We did not fly again until that problem was corrected.

To signal our continuing commitment to rewarding such diligence, we also made it a point to praise a very young examiner--a fellow named David Strait--the young contractor employee who had actually discovered the cracks. Other flight decisions made throughout the year were made with the goal of operational safety being paramount. And from working with the dedicated employees who keep the shuttle flying safely, I know they have the utmost regard for the enormity of that duty.

This week, at NASA centers throughout the country and in the field, with the support of more than 2,000 people from more than 20 federal agencies, state and local organizations, the important work of data analysis and recovery operations is continuing. We should all be extremely proud of the work that is being conducted by these dedicated public servants.

President Bush observed last week, ``The people of NASA are being tested once again. In your grief, you are responding as your friends would have wished--with focus, professionalism and unbroken faith in the mission of this agency. Captain Brown was correct. America's space program will go on.''

We intend to maintain that professionalism he referred to until we reach conclusion and beyond.

This morning, to help frame our discussion, I would like to review for you the significant actions NASA has taken since the morning of the accident, in accord with our contingency plan. In addition to articulating notification of first response procedures, defining the roles and responsibilities of mishap response and mishap investigation teams, the plan specifies selection of persons outside of NASA to head an independent, seasoned accident investigation team.

While we did not foresee this tragedy, our response has unfolded as we had planned and prepared for in that contingency plan that we had hoped to never have to activate. This plan was one of many positive outcomes from the terrible loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger 17 years ago.

So we developed the plan shortly after that and have updated it before every flight. And a contingency was simulated for this very event just three months ago.
When we first became aware of the problems with STS-107, I was waiting at the space shuttle landing strip at the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral on Saturday morning, February the 1st. At 8:59 a.m. eastern time, we lost communications with the Columbia.

At 9:16, the countdown arrival clock reached zero and there was no signal or sign of the Columbia. Captain Bill Readdy, our associate administrator for space flight, declared a space flight contingency and activated the Recovery Control Center at the Kennedy Space Center.

At that point, Bill Readdy and I departed the landing strip and headed to the Launch Control Center.

We arrived at the Launch Control Center 13 minutes later. And at 9:29 a.m., we activated the contingency action plan for space flight operations. Through the White House situation room, we notified the president, as well as other senior staff, of the loss of communications. In addition, members of Congress and the government of Israel were notified.

Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and the National Security Council were also made aware of the situation and were present there in the situation room that morning. Secretary Ridge then began assessing the possibility that this situation was terrorism-related. Shortly after, he made a determination that it was highly unlikely terrorism was involved. Secretary Ridge then announced that the Federal Emergency Management Agency would be the lead federal agency for the recovery effort on the ground.

Meanwhile, the family members of the Columbia astronauts were escorted from the landing strip to the astronaut's crew quarters. Later that morning, at about 11:30, we met with the families at the crew quarters at Kennedy Space Center to express our condolences, offer any and all support we could give and assure them that we would offer that support throughout this entire ordeal and stated our commitment to find the cause of the accident, fix the problems we find and continue the work that their loved ones had started.

Data at all the NASA sites and contractors were impounded at 10:00 a.m. And the headquarters action team in Washington, D.C. was activated, with NASA personnel moving immediately to their duty stations.

By 10:30, an hour after the contingency plan had been activated, the Mishap Response Team convened to assess the preliminary data and focus on the location of the crew compartment through the Rescue Coordination Center at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. The Rapid Response Team was activated for deployment to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana that day.

The process of initiating the Columbia Accident Investigation Board began about 10:30 a.m. on Saturday, February 1st, one hour after the contingency plan was activated. I placed a call to the NASA deputy administrator, Fred Gregory--again, also a former astronaut--who was at NASA headquarters in Washington. Mr. Gregory then began calling the Columbia Accident Investigation Board members, which are specified by position, in the contingency action plan.

At 1:15 that afternoon, I made a brief televised statement expressing our national regrets for the tragic accident and informed the public about the appointment of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. The Accident Investigation Board was formally activated during the NASA Mishap Investigation Team teleconference, which occurred at 5:00 p.m. that afternoon, Saturday, February the 1st, less than eight hours after the event.

O'KEEFE: By 6:00 p.m. during a teleconference with the White House situation room, we briefed officials from the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Defense, the FBI and the Federal Aviation Administration about the current status of the accident investigation. At 6:40 that evening, staff members of the National Transportation Safety Board departed Washington and traveled to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana to assist as part of the Mishap Investigation Team--that day. They were later made available to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

On Sunday, February 2nd, the Accident Investigation Board, chaired by retired United States Navy Admiral Hal Gehman, held its first meeting at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, less than 30 hours after the accident. We also began the practice of twice daily briefings at headquarters in Washington and at the Johnson Space Center in Houston.

Membership in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board consists of persons selected for their positions in heading civil and military offices with responsibilities for aerospace safety accident investigations and related skills. Many have been chief investigators on major accidents. And between them, the board members have the experience of some 50 major investigations to draw upon.

Quite simply, the people who are now on the board are some of the best in the world at what they do. And they were activated immediately.

You have our assurance that this distinguished board will be able to act with genuine independence. When the board assembled, it modified its charter to eliminate any reference to NASA directing the administration of the investigation. So the framework that was contained in the contingency plan was modified--and will continue to be--to assure the independence of this board.

NASA accepted the changes to the charter without objection, as I will continue to do in the future as well, for any changes they propose. Further, the NASA inspector general, Robert Cobb, is an observer on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, having arrived on Monday, February 3rd. He will help assure the independence of the board as he reports both to the president and to the Congress under the terms of the Inspector General Act.

There are additional details about the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and its activities that are, I think, important to note. The board has taken over hardware and software releases of NASA so that we cannot alter anything unless the board approves. We has already begun to honor document requests from the board--as we have all along--and have also supplied additional documents to the board, which were not requested, but we believe might be helpful in their work as we move along.

And finally, the board has instructed NASA to conduct a fault tree analysis, that it intends to independently validate, to look at all the possible causes that could have occurred and to examine those in a very methodical way, which they will then in turn independently validate.

On Sunday, the NASA Mishap Investigation Team was on the ground and working with local officials in Texas and Louisiana. The state of Texas activated 800 members of the Texas National Guard to assist with the retrieval of debris. And I am eternally grateful to Governor Rick Perry for his immediate response, within hours of our request.

By Tuesday, there were nearly 200 NASA and NASA contractor personnel working recovery operations in Texas, Louisiana, Arizona and California. They were part of the more than 2,000 people from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, the FBI, the Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation, the U.S. Forest Service, Texas National Guard, Louisiana National Guard and state and local authorities working to locate, document and collect debris.

By Wednesday, the astronauts' remains were transported to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. At Dover, NASA Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory--and a former astronaut--and a ceremonial honor guard were present to pay our respects to the seven fallen astronauts.

Throughout the week, we were able to make steady progress in our effort to recover debris from the accident. We have thus far recovered upwards of 12,000 elements of debris.

The search effort, as you know from our press conferences, is a large, complex and ongoing effort with hundreds of square miles with challenging weather and terrain conditions. And indeed, the graphic that's up now is that 500-mile swath from Dallas-Ft. Worth area to just south of Shreveport, Louisiana, in and around the Lufkin, Texas area.

We are very grateful that no one was injured on the ground as a result of flying debris from the accident. And we are working with our agency partners to ensure recovery operations remain safe as we continue this effort.

Throughout the course of this activity, I have also briefed the president and the vice president on a near-daily basis, to advise and apprise them of all the progress we're making, as well as the cooperation of all of the federal agencies who have been extremely participating in this effort.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency command post was set up in Lufkin, Texas on Saturday, the 1st of February, and has been operating non-stop since then. Debris collection activities began at Barksdale Air Force Base on Sunday, February the 2nd.

Yesterday, we began transporting debris on trucks to the Kennedy Space Center, where they will be assembled and analyzed as part of the comprehensive accident investigation directed by the Gehman Board. I visited Texas and Louisiana this past Saturday to get my own assessment of the operation and, more importantly, to personally thank the volunteers, in addition to all the federal, state and local public servants, who have worked so tirelessly to support the debris recovery effort.

Let me touch briefly on the space shuttle fleet as it is today. Discovery is continuing to undergo major inspections and upgrades, which will be completed by April of 2004. Atlantis is currently assembled and stacked in the Vehicle Assembly Building at the Kennedy Space Center for STS-114, the next mission due to have or plan to have been flown. The Endeavor, the third of the orbiters, is in the Orbiter Processing Facility and being prepared for STS-115, which was scheduled a couple of months later.

The next shuttle mission, STS-114, was to have been to the International Space Station in March. That mission, commanded by Colonel Eileen Collins, United States Air Force--and I met with her on Friday to further advise that the mission is on hold until we understand the causes of the Columbia accident and are able to resolve any issues identified. At this time, we don't know how long it will be before we can resume shuttle flights. We will only know when the Columbia Accident Investigation Board concludes its work and presents its findings to all of us.

Columbia was the first orbiter in the shuttle fleet, having flown 28 successful missions, or just over a quarter of its certified life of 100 flights. In February 2001, a little over a year ago, Columbia completed a major scheduled 18-month overhaul and update of its systems, a process we call Orbiter Major Modifications.

The STS-107 mission was Columbia's second flight following that major overhaul and a successful servicing mission that had been conducted--the first one--was to the Hubble Space Telescope in March 2002. So this was the second flight after it had been nearly completely rebuilt.

Prior to the loss of Columbia and her crew, the projected shuttle flight rate was five per year starting in 2004. And funding is requested for that flight rate in the budget the president just submitted last week. The flight rate will be adjusted as needed, of course, once we determine when we can return to flight safely.

The crew of the International Space Station is, of course, deeply saddened by the loss of Columbia and her crew, as are all of our partners and people around the world. I spoke with International Space Station crew members--Ken Bowersox, the commander, United States Navy; Don Pettit, who is our science officer aboard; and Nikolai Budarin, who is a cosmonaut engineer--on Sunday, February the 2nd for the first time in our discussions to inform them of the accident and how we are proceeding. Despite this tragedy, the crew is continuing its busy schedule of work.

The day after the loss of STS-107, our Russian partners conducted a successful planned launch of an unmanned, autonomous Progress resupply vehicle to the station. The provisions carried on Progress 10P should provide the crew sufficient supplies to maintain normal operations through June 2003, through this summer.

Progress resupply flights to the International Space Station by our Russian partners will continue as scheduled. The next flight is scheduled for June 2003. We are working with Rosaviakosmos, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency officials, to determine what we might want to place on the flight to make sure we make the best use of the space available. In addition, a regularly scheduled Soyuz crew transport vehicle exchange is planned already for the launch in April 2003, as it had been prior to February 1st.

Study teams formed almost immediately after the accident to assess the impact on International Space Station. These teams are focused on how we will: first, sustain the station; second, continue to assemble the station, as it is not yet complete; and third, to maximize the utilization of this unique research platform.

We have kept our International Space Station partners informed of our recovery efforts. Further, we have met with our international partners just last week--and continue to each day--to plan future meetings in the weeks ahead to develop an International Space Station partner plan.

We can maintain a permanent crew on the International Space Station as long as is necessary with support from Soyuz and Progress flights. The International Space Station is stable and has sufficient propellant to maintain its orbit for at least a year without support from the space shuttle.

But the nearer term issue for crew support beyond June is water. The International Space Station cannot support a crew of three after June with the currently planned support from Progress. As a consequence, we are discussing with our international partners the possibility of changing the April Soyuz flight from a taxi mission to a crew exchange mission, as well as the feasibility of adding Progress resupply flights.

I want to really emphasize that there are no decisions that have been made. And all options are being examined at present.

I have talked to the Expedition Six crew that Captain Bowersox commands--now on-orbit. And they have expressed determination and desire to do whatever is necessary to continue their research and deal with any changes in the crew rotation schedule that may be necessary.

As we look forward to determine our nation's best course of action in responding to the Columbia accident, I'd like to point out that NASA has developed an Integrated Space Transportation Plan, which was submitted by the president to Congress in November as an amendment to the fiscal year 2003 budget. So three months ago, that plan was presented at that time.

The Integrated Space Transportation Plan can help us address many of the near-term issues we are facing, even though it was developed prior to the loss of Columbia. The plan reflects the tight coupling required across the Space Station, space shuttle and the space launch initiatives.

It is intended to ensure that necessary access to the International Space Station can be supported for the foreseeable future. It consists of three major program elements: the space shuttle, the orbital space plane and the next generation launch technology.

The new plan makes investments to extend shuttle's operational life for continued safe operations. The orbital space plane is designed to provide a crew transfer capability as early as possible to assure access to and from the International Space Station. And the next generation launch technology program funds next generation reusable launch vehicle technology in areas such as propulsion, structures and operations.

This initiative will focus on the orbital space plane and the next generation launch technology, including third generation RLV efforts.

The 2003 budget amendment that the president submitted last November, 2002, also proposed adding funds to International Space Station reserves to assure that we could successfully reach the milestone of U.S. core configuration and maintain progress on long-lead items for enhanced research aboard the space station and the continued buildout of that remarkable research laboratory platform.

Space flight is a means to an end at NASA. That end is research, exploration, discovery and inspiration.

The crew of STS-107 were engaged in a wide array of scientific research that could be conducted nowhere else but in space, and had significant potential benefits for the public. Columbia's crew took great pride in their research aimed at fighting cancer, improving crop yields, developing fire-suppression techniques, building earthquake-resistant buildings and understanding the effects of dust storms on weather.

As was reported by the media, ``Columbia had a cargo of human ingenuity.''
The crew of the International Space Station is also conducting research now that cannot be conducted anywhere else. Thus far, more than 60 experiments spanning across such scientific disciplines as human physiology, genetics, plant biology, earth observations, physics and cell biology have been conducted on the International Space Station.

From these experiments, scientists are learning better methods of drug testing and about dynamic models of human diseases, the physics of fundamental processes in manufacturing, antibiotic synthesis and changes in Earth climate, vegetation, and crops.

The International Space Station is the centerpiece initiative of human space flight at NASA. Our objectives in this regard are very clear.

First, we will keep our on-orbit International Space Station crew safe. Second, we intend to keep the International Space Station continuously occupied in order to assure the reliability of the station itself. And third, we intend to return to assembly as soon as we are able to return the shuttle fleet to safe operations and complete the research goals set for ourselves and our international partners.

To accomplish these aims, we need to create a long-term crew return capability to complement and augment the Soyuz vehicles now provided by our Russian partners. We intend to build on that new return capability to create a new crew transfer system that will allow us to rotate crews on the International Space Station, independent from the space shuttle.

We also firmly believe that extending the operational life of the remaining shuttle fleet is a good investment because it will help maximize the science return from the International Space Station.

We designed our Integrated Space Transportation Plan to ensure that we had the coordinated resources to exploit the unique research environment of space and the International Space Station in the near-, mid-, and long-term. We thought the plan was a good one when we proposed it. And we believe that it is not only valid today but even more compelling to pursue. While we believe that this plan is a good one, we will reexamine, as necessary, in light of the investigative findings of Columbia.

Just over a week ago-although it seems more like a lifetime-the president spoke so eloquently and powerfully at the Johnson Space Center memorial service in Houston, Texas. He said, ``The cause of exploration and discovery is not an option we choose. It is a desire written in the human heart. We are that part of creation which seeks to understand all creation. We find the best among us, send them forth into unmapped darkness and pray they will return. They go in peace for all mankind. And all mankind is in their debt.''

The noble purposes described in the president's words frame all that we do and how we do it. These purposes drive our mission goals, which are: to understand and protect our home planet; to explore the universe and search for life; and to inspire the next generation of explorers, as only NASA can.

And even while our nonstop work to recover from this terrible tragedy and to continue safe operations on the International Space Station will be our chief focus in the days and weeks and months ahead, the American people should know that we will also press ahead with our other activities to achieve these important goals.

This centennial flight year, we are launching the Mars Exploration Rovers, the Mars Express spacecraft, the Space Infrared Telescope Facility and a number of Earth science spacecraft and instruments, as well as continuing our work to help improve aviation security on behalf of our Homeland Defense. In these activities and in all we do at NASA, we strive for unmatched excellence.

And when it comes to human space exploration, those margins are razor thin. And we know we are graded on an extremely harsh curve. For us, 96 percent to 99 percent is not an ``A.'' One hundred percent is the minimum passing grade.
Despite this harsh truth, we know the lesson from this terrible accident is not to turn our backs on exploration because it is hard or risky. John Shedd once said about the age of ocean exploration, ``A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are built for.''

Human history teaches us that in exploration, after accidents like this occur, we learn from them and further reduce risk, although we must honestly admit that risks can never be eliminated. President John F. Kennedy observed once, some 41 years ago, speaking of our fledgling space program at that time, ``All great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties. And both must be enterprised and overcome with answerable courage.''

The immediate task before our agency is clear. We will find the problem that caused the loss of Columbia and its crew. We will fix it. And we will return to flight operations that are as safe as humanly possible in pursuit of knowledge.

We have no preconceptions about what caused the failure or what it will take to make it so that it will never happen again. We have an independent accident investigation board of truly outstanding and eminently qualified individuals. And they--and only they alone--will determine the cause of the accident and its remedy, no matter where it leads. We are ready and willing to support the addition of any experts that Admiral Gehman deems necessary to the effective conduct of the board's investigations.

Part of my job as administrator is to remind folks of what NASA does and what we are capable of doing. It's a responsibility I take very, very seriously.

At the same time, I am saddened beyond words for the loss of seven outstanding men and women of STS-107. I am also very proud and humbled by the focus, dedication and professionalism of the NASA family and all those throughout the country who are assisting in this challenging recovery effort.

Today, February 12, is also the birthday of President Lincoln. And some of his words, spoken for an entirely different purpose, have come to mind this past week, ``It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us-that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion.''

We have an opportunity here and now to learn from this loss, and renew the boundless spirit of exploration present at NASA's beginning. We will do this by being accountable to the American people for our failings and, we hope, credible and compelling in pursuit of research, exploration and inspiration for future generations.

Finally, during the 16-day STS-107 mission, we had no indication that would suggest a compromise to flight safety. The time it has taken me to present this testimony is about the same amount of time that transpired between when mission control first noticed anomalies in temperature measurements and the accident.

I just paused for a few seconds. That's the same amount of time that transpired from mission control's last communication with the crew and our loss of signal with the heroic Columbia astronauts.

May God bless the crew of STS-107.

Chairman McCain, Chairman Boehlert, thank you all very much for your attention.

MCCAIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator.

The chair recognizes the ranking member of the House Science Committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hall.

HALL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Chairman McCain. And I thank this group. Mr. O'Keefe, I thank you and your deputy and your associate administrator for space flight and those valiant people who sit behind you there that contribute so much, day in and day out. We're grateful to you.

And I speak for Bart Gordon, who is the chairman of the Space Subcommittee, who has the same respect I have for the leadership. And this is a day and time when we should be neither Republicans nor Democrats, but Americans. And I think it's a day and time when we come together.

And Mr. Administrator, you did a great job that Monday, that fateful Monday in Houston. Thank you for that.

I think certainly that this is one of the most painful hearings that I've ever had the duty to try to get prepared for. It's less than two weeks now since the shuttle broke apart in the sky, up over my home and my area in Texas. I'm saddened every time I think of these seven brave astronauts and the grief-stricken families that they left behind.

I knew three of them very well. And the young lady from India, who had accomplished so much and came so far, came to my district on more than one occasion, had a great sense of humor, was really great for the program.
In one of her speeches to one of the classes in Canton, in Van Zandt, Texas, one of the students said, ``We have a hard time pronouncing your name.'' She said, ``That's all right. I have a hard time pronouncing yours.''

(LAUGHTER)

She had a way with the youngsters and was very helpful. I'm sure that there are a lot of questions about what went wrong. And I'm going to shorten my speech here because we have so many others that really should be heard from. And we have questions that we have to ask you.

There has also been a lot of speculation as to what or who may be to blame for the accident. The reality is that it doesn't appear that anyone yet knows what caused the accident, although the NASA administrator may have some information in the progress of the investigation to share with us today. And you have done that. And I thank you.

And I think the questions will elicit more information and will be helpful to us. So it's likely to be some time before we will be clear on what factors have contributed to the accident; thus, it's important that we have a thorough--and I want to stress independent, as Mr. Goldin has stressed--investigation of the accident, so that the American people can be assured that everything is on top of the table.

And I know that's what everybody in this room wants. Anything less would be a disservice to the courageous men and women who died on the Columbia.
Our nation is grieving. We're mournful at this time. And the families are in mourning.

But time lessens and sometimes heals that. But that same time is going to bolster the need for an independent investigation. And that's what we're looking for.

And Mr. Administrator, I understand that you pledged to do that. And we thank you for that.

I think we need to take a very close look at what can be done to improve shuttle crew survivability. As a longtime member of this committee, I have always had problems cutting the NASA budget, because not having the knowledge that you men have, not having the exposure of life or death that so many of you have, I didn't know how to cut it or how to recommend cutting it, without endangering someone.

So we have had to call on the administrator to do that. We had to call on Dan Goldin to do that. He did it and, I think, did it in a good manner.

We call on you, Mr. O'Keefe, to give us that same type leadership. And we pledge our support to you as we seek out causation on how to keep it from ever happening again.

NASA is talking about spending upwards of $9 billion to $13 billion, by its own estimates, over the next decade, to develop a still-to-be-defined orbital space plane. That's long-range planning. We have to have that. And we have to have some short-range decisions.

I think we need to examine whether some of that money would be better spent on developing crew escape systems for the existing shuttle fleet and on completing a simple, reliable, U.S. crew rescue vehicle for the International Space Station, and doing both of these things as soon as possible.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to put my full speech in the record. And I yield back the time.

Thank you.

MCCAIN: Without objection. Senator Stevens has to return quickly to chair the conference concerning the omnibus appropriations bill, which all of us eagerly await the result of his work. And so he would like to make a brief statement.
Senator Stevens?

STEVENS: Mr. Chairman, I thank you. And I do have to return to that conference. I have come because the gentleman that's before you, I consider to be one of the closest friends I have in the world. I think members should know who he is.

He came to Washington as a White House Fellow. He worked for the Department of the Navy. Then he became a Senate employee and became the chief of staff of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

He went from there to become the comptroller of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy. He subsequently became a professor at Syracuse University, then a deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget and is now the administrator of NASA.

I know of no one who has committed himself to good government and conducted himself in the finest of our traditions than Sean O'Keefe. He's a man of integrity, of complete honesty and openness in all he does. I would back him, as I know he would me, with my life.

And I urge you to listen to Sean O'Keefe today. He will tell you the truth. Thank you very much.

O'KEEFE: Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it.

MCCAIN: Thank you, Senator Stevens.

Thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for your presentation. One of the issues that is going to be talked about a lot today by a lot of the members is the issue as to whether the NASA's budget was--quote--''starved,'' ``cut to the bone.'' There will be allegations that certain recommendations were made by certain people.

For example, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel annual report for 2001 stated--quote--''The current and proposed budget are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of operating the space shuttle.'' You've seen a lot of rhetoric in the media--and you have too--that you were starved.

That was not my experience as chairman and ranking member of the Commerce Committee. But I think it's very important you take that issue head-on and immediately.

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. No, I fully agree. There is no question this is a concern that we continue to have, as well. And to assure that all of the facts that are laid out on that particular matter, as it pertains to the views of the ASAP and the advisory committee as well, their reports, I think, reiterate consistently their view that the future concerns about space shuttle operations and safety considerations were the matter they were most focused on.

And so, as a consequence, their continued effort that I see in the report before, as always, is that--and I quote specifically--''It's important to stress, the panel believes that safety has not yet been compromised. NASA and its contractors maintain excellent safety practices and processes, as well as an appropriate level of safety consciousness. This has contributed to significant flight achievements. And the defined requirements for operating at an acceptable level of risk are always met.''

So their concerns were always presented in the context of future approaches. And as a matter of fact, if we call up slide number 35, that will cover that particular question as well. Their focus was always on the future operations, as well as future efforts, that were to be engaged in.

At the present time, in terms of current operations and activities, they certified as recently as a year ago, they felt that the current operations were concentrated on very specifically to assure flight safety as a primary, paramount objective.
MCCAIN: I think you're going to be confronted with some numbers in further questioning. And I hope you will have responses to that as well.

At a Commerce Committee, September 6, 2001 hearing on shuttle safety, William Readdy, then deputy associate administrator of the Office of Space Flight, acknowledged the challenges NASA was facing to maintain shuttle safety in light of budgetary constraints, but nevertheless stated--quote--''The safety of the space shuttle has also been dramatically improved by reducing risk by more than a factor of five.''

Later in his testimony, he said--quote--''The space shuttle is the safest, most capable and reliable transportation system in the world.'' Mr. Blomberg, the former chief of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, testifying before the House Science Committee in April 2002, on behalf of the advisory panel, stated that--quote--''In all the years of my involvement, I have never been as concerned for space shuttle safety as I am right now. The concern is not for the present flight or the next or perhaps the one after that.''

``In fact, one of the roots of my concern is that nobody will know for sure when the safety margins have been eroded too far. All of my instincts, however, suggest that the current approach is planting the seeds for future danger.''
How do we reconcile those two statements by two highly regarded individuals who are within the bureaucracy of NASA?

O'KEEFE: Well, just to clarify the record on that, Bill Readdy, of course, is the associate administrator for space flight. Richard Blomberg was an independent, external member of and a chairman of the advisory panel for safety. So he was not a full-time NASA employee in that regard. He was representing a panel view.

Reconciling that is, I think if you trace the history just a little bit, the plan that had existed until this past November contemplated the retirement of the space shuttle fleet as early as the middle of this decade; certainly no later than 2012. So it altered over the course of several years from about 95 percent forward, the best I can tell of the history of this.

Based on the recommendations of that advisory panel on safety, as well as the testimony and comments made at several different committee hearings as well, we went back and really looked seriously at the question of: what it would take in order to maintain shuttle operations for a sustained period of time? What kind of continued upgrades would be necessary, modifications necessary, in order to assure safe flight operations?

And on the basis of that, as recently as last summer, went through that planning effort, which ultimately yielded the amendment that was sent forward by the president on November 13 of last year, to propose a specific change in the funding profile for shuttle, which envisioned a maintenance of that asset for a sustained period of time, through next decade.

So the focus of these concerns, which were all exactly as you stated it, Mr. Chairman, in the context of future concern, were the things we were very mindful of, took heed of, made adjustments to and specifically put in plan in order to assure that we covered those kinds of concerns in the future and addressed those.

As it pertained to current flight operations, again, there was no indication that I knew of that raised concerns along the way of current flight operations. If anything, the diligence I see among the entire folk in the NASA community is very much that of a culture that is dedicated to assuring safe flight operations, or else the launch doesn't occur. And that is the mindset that we continue to encourage and will continue to encourage in the future.

BOEHLERT: Mr. O'Keefe, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I remain concerned about language throughout the charter of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. The language would appear to indicate that everything the board does is subject to NASA approval. And that, to me, raises some fundamental questions about the independence of the board. And we all want the board to be independent, not just in name, but in fact.

Are you willing to re-examine that charter and remove some of the language that raises these questions and make adjustments in other places?

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. We will continue to work with Admiral Gehman to assure whatever he needs in order to guarantee the independence and objectivity of that board, we will absolutely work with, without objection.

BOEHLERT: Just to give you an example, ``the independent board will conduct activities in accordance with the provisions of applicable NASA policies and procedures.'' And then it goes on to say, ``the interim schedule board activities, interim board reports and the submission of the final board report in coordination with the NASA administrator.''

I think that they would have independence so that they could schedule their meetings and determine the type of report they want to submit. Of course, they will submit the report to you. But the report should come also to--the final report--not just to the NASA administrator, but to the president, the Congress and the American people.

So I think that charter has to be revisited and very promptly. We've already had conversations with each other. And I have had with Admiral Gehman. And both have assured me that additional members from outside the community--so to speak--eminent experts in different fields, will be added to the board. I think that's very important.

It's essential that we maintain the independent nature of the board.

O'KEEFE: I fully concur, Mr. Chairman. As a matter of fact, I think in Admiral Gehman's press conference yesterday, he was very explicit that all of the factors he needed in order to maintain independence and to be an objective investigator in this particular case, for all of his board members, was what the present condition required.

Having said that if, on examination, the latest change that was made to the charter at his request, we made it. If he wants further changes, they will be made as well. Anything that it takes in order to guarantee their independence. Because we will be guided by their findings. And as I have reiterated publicly, as well as to you sir--and to him--that about the only thing that will be unique about the reporting requirement is that he will be putting an address that says, ``NASA'' on it on the envelope, sending it to us. But that report will be made public, concurrent with its receipt.

So he will be reporting to the president, to the Congress, to the American people, to all of us, simultaneously.

BOEHLERT: Well, I was comforted by my conversation with Admiral Gehman because he is insisting on independence. And he has also indicated--obviously, you will have to have a liaison with NASA and use some of your resources. But the staffing will be independent of NASA. And I think that's essential.

Obviously, we're all going to be spending a lot of time looking at shuttle contracts, even though there is no indication at this point that they are a problem. How comfortable are you that the incentives in the current contracts captured the proper balance between efficiency and safety?

And then as a follow on, do the contracts have clauses that will ensure that the contractors have to--must--cooperate fully with the Gehman investigation?

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. On the first part, the emphasis on safety in the current space flight operations contract that we have very much emphasizes the safety parameters. And indeed, they have tremendous incentives to do better each and every time.

And as a consequence of that, there are a series of weighted factors in the guidelines that heavily look at the metrics of any difficulties or problems on orbit or at launch or any other time. As they drive those factors down, they are given a specific incentive to do better in each of those cases. So they've got a powerful motivation to want to move in that direction.

In doing so, I think the approach also yields some efficiencies. But that's a secondary matter at most. And so as a result, there are real advantages and real emphasis on the safety considerations that are currently built into that contract framework.

As it pertains to their cooperation with the Gehman Board, positively. We will advise them--and have--that we fully expect everyone to be cooperative with that board. We have absolutely nothing to hide. There is no evidence or no fact that we can think of out there, short of national security information or some private proprietary issue that some individual may want to assert, that would preclude us from making any information available.

And so everyone within the contractor community should feel the same as we do.

BOEHLERT: But is there something more than a moral obligation or a desire? Is there something that binds them, commits them to cooperate fully with the Gehman Investigation Board?

O'KEEFE: I will take you up on your opening statement, that on that contract clause, I don't know. But I will found out.

BOEHLERT: Thank you very much.

MCCLAIN: Senator Hollings?

HOLLINGS: Right to the point, with respect to cost--and I'm sure you don't have, Mr. O'Keefe, the actual figures with you--but on the shortchanging of the space program, we had a report on yesterday, in the ``New York Times,'' stating that we had cut the space program $800 million.

I've been checking it overnight. My check is $700 million.

Be that as it may, what's the truth? That's what we want. I asked on last week, Mitch Daniels of the OMB, Office of Management and Budget, to furnish the Budget Committee the figures of what was requested by NASA. I want you to furnish the figures that NASA requested of OMB for the last 10 years, not just this administration, the past administrations, to see the trend line there of just exactly how we financed.

Otherwise, yes, we all are trying to find out the cause. But in the meantime, as you try to piece together the--retrieve parts and everything else like that. I don't know how long that will take. A year, a month, whatever it is. We all want to see the space program continue.

And for this senator, I don't want it to continue with upgrades. I've heard enough about these upgrades. We've lost 14 astronauts and $5 billion in hardware with upgrades.

And we had a new reusable launch vehicle. We had a spaceship. That was canceled year before last. And then we had a reusable launch vehicle. And that was canceled last November, just a couple of months ago.

And you said we were going to use these vehicles, shuttles until 2020. You would use, being responsible for safety, you would try to use one of these shuttles, with all of these tiles flying off and everything else and after all of these losses? You would still want to use them until 2020 and not get new technology, Mr. Administrator?

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. No, thank you.

As I understand the history here, the effort during the course of the '90s was in anticipation of a retirement of shuttle concurrent with the introduction of a new reusable launch vehicle. That was envisioned to be the X-33, as I understand it.
Based on a variety of technical issues, which were based on the assumption that a series of unconquerable engineering and laws of physics challenges would be overcome, ultimately that--I think it was two-plus years ago, the choice was made to cancel that program and to continue with shuttle operations. What we proposed a year ago and is not a cancellation of any RLV effort--reusable launch vehicle; instead, it's a selection, if you will, of looking at the integrated space transportation plan.

What's included in the November amendment that the president sent forward for the 2003 budget is a selection specifically of an orbitable space plane option, which frankly is not a technology leap. It is the capability of putting aboard an expendable launch vehicle, an orbitable space system, space plane that would be launched in a conventional manner, using an expendable launch vehicle.

The next generation beyond that is what we focus on our next generation launch technology. So we have tried to narrow in focus a lot more the space launch initiative efforts in order to get some near-term gain to supplement, to compliment the space shuttle and to provide that dynamic, as well as flexible, return system and transfer system to the International Space Station, and also to pursue the development of a reusable launch vehicle that may be, hopefully, the product of breakthroughs that were not possible, that forced the motivation or the cancellation a few years ago of the X-33.

So we're trying to do both of those concurrently, but to get some near-term capability and, in the meantime, use shuttle in the future as a cargo lift, heavy lift capacity, which is what it was really designed to do in the first place, rather than a crew transfer capability. So were trying to balance both ends of that, to utilize capabilities for their best purposes as we move along.

HOLLINGS: We've got to find out what you think we ought to appropriate. We all want to continue space exploration. But we just don't want to waste time waiting on the results, on the one hand, on trying to find out what we already know.
Let's get on and get your best advice on how we should proceed to get going on this thing and not just with upgrades.

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. No, the . . .

MCCAIN: Thank you very much, senator.

Mr. Hall?

HALL: Mr. O'Keefe, you heard my opening statement. And I'm quite frankly disappointed that 17 years after the Challenger accident, so little attention has been given to developing crew escape systems for our astronauts, whether they're flying on the shuttle or whether they're in the Space Station.

I know you share that. I share with you the disappointment and the blame. I've been here 23 years. So it's a partnership for us. And that's what it is. That's what it will continue to be.

But especially since NASA has indicated that the shuttle is going to fly for another decade and a half and maybe--probably--longer than that. And in light of a media report, I think, on February the 5th that NASA's most recent effort in that regard was a $5 million study in 2001, to put that study in context, the amount expended on that potential shuttle crew escape system amounted to just a little bit more than one-tenth of one percent of a single year's budget.

That doesn't strike me as being very aggressive in your effort to look for ways to improve the odds of survival for astronauts in the event of a shuttle accident. That leads me to say that I have no doubt that it is going to be challenging to develop a practical crew escape system for the shuttle.

But NASA is in the business of performing miracles. NASA is in the business of meeting challenges. And we call on you to do that.

I am very afraid that a clue as to why NASA is not doing more is found elsewhere in that article, namely--and I quote--''The proposed fixes were also seen as prohibitively expensive additions to an already aging and financially strapped shuttle fleet.''

We've seen a similar situation with regard to the development of a crew rescue vehicle for the International Space Station. So as you know, NASA decided to cancel the ongoing development of U.S. crew rescue vehicles, just as a demonstration vehicle, we thought was readying its--nearing its flight test. And now we're dependent on the Russians for their crew rescue vehicles until the end of this decade.

So in the meantime, I guess my question to you is: did you explicitly consider investing in the development of space shuttle crew escape systems when you revised the integrated space transportation plan that you announced last November?

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. We continue to look at what we would use as enhancements, if you will, of the space shuttle as part of that November amendment that was submitted last November. And we're getting together here--had planned to all along--to identify that priority set of what will emphasize the highest safety margin improvements that could be yielded from different modification to the orbiter system.

But with regard to the specific crew escape efforts, recall that since Challenger, there have been a number of operational changes made. There is an egress system that was put into place right the Challenger accident that was part of the Rogers Commission recommendations--that ultimately stem from it, I should say--that we put into place, that now still exist to this day.

Once launched though, there is a number of different approaches that have been proposed, examined, reviewed and all of which added significant amounts of weight, I am advised, to the overall effort and so, as a consequences, were viewed to be technically infeasible.

What we have instituted, though, is a series of abort procedures. And as recently as the December launch of the STS-113, on a perfectly clear night at Cape Canaveral in Florida, where everything was nominal, everything was ready to go, all the systems were completely operational, we scrubbed the launch because the alternate abort site at Zaragoza, Spain, the weather continued to be marginal.

So we take every precaution in this process, in order to assure that, all the way through ascent, that every possible opportunity is there, as much as possible. But again, the idea of an escape system was looked at, examined very thoroughly. And the conclusion was that the weight factor would almost be prohibitive, in terms of its technical clarification.

So we will continue to look at that. We will go back and look at it again, you bet. In light of this circumstance, we really do need to focus entirely on what all the alternatives are.

And I guarantee you, sir, we'll make that part of our effort underway now as part of this November amendment that is before the Congress, to consider for the 2003 program, that we'll factor that into the equation and proceed as appropriate.

HALL: Even on a local level, city councils rarely ever fix a bad bridge or a bad turn in the road until a teenager gets killed. And then it's too late. It seems to me that we launched the vehicle without any ability to dock. We lost a vehicle because we didn't have telescopic ability to inspect.

We have three birds left. I just urge caution. And I thank you for your time. I yield back my time.

O'KEEFE: Thank you. Appreciate it very much.

MCCAIN: Senator Brownback?

BROWNBACK: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'Keefe, thank you very much for coming in front of our joint committees here and your great leadership of NASA in a really difficult and a trying and challenging time. We all grieve the loss of human life that's happened to NASA.

And at this particular point, I'm chairing the subcommittee in the Senate that will be dealing with this. And I want to work with you and your agency as we lay out the future of manned space flight in the United States.

I want to ask you about the broad objectives and the broad program objectives that we're on and about right now. It seems to me that the space program is really at a critical juncture and that the totality of the space program is. And it's got to decide amongst a couple of competing options.

One is to maintain the current set of programs and current missions. The second one that you read a lot about in the newspaper and people speculating, is to dramatically reduce manned space flight, go into more robotics and different types of vehicles, questioning about the safety and to try to be more safe.

And the third, that a number of people are saying, that our vision is too small in space currently right now, that we need new initiatives. We need to go back to the moon. We need to go to Mars.

And we're at this tremendous fork in the road, decision of which path to take. It's certainly my intent on the subcommittee to look closely at where NASA has been and where you are today and where we plan to go into the future. And most importantly, we need to discuss as well the financial situation, the terms of how we get NASA where it needs to be.

I'm glad to see in the Appropriations Committee we're putting in an additional $414 million over the president's request.

The goal is to reflect an accurate and effective determination for the future of NASA. And I would simply like to ask you: what have you done recently--and I realize you're dealing with the tragedy mostly now--but to look at this need for a review of the mission of NASA amongst these three policy objectives? Have you had a chance to start contemplating some of that?

And I hope you will be open to working openly with the Congress as we look at this fork in the road we're in right now.

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. Of course, senator. I would be delighted to work with you and any other members of Congress to sort through really what is the proper role and objective of NASA and our pursuit of exploration objectives, always.

We have, indeed, had an opportunity, prior to February 1st, to really think seriously about what is the strategy and the focus of how we concentrate on what we do best and do that only in a way that guarantees and assures that what we--to offer to folks that we can actually deliver on and have a capability to look at longer-term exploration objectives. And I think that's contained in the strategic planning documents that were all forwarded, along with the budget that was submitted by the president just last Monday.

Prior to that, in all the efforts we put into it, was to think seriously about the very kind of questions you have raised and, again, to narrowly focus on the kinds of exploration and discovery objectives we think we do exceptionally well. And for those that are done by others or can be pursued elsewhere, to leave that to folks who have expertise or capabilities that would otherwise have to be duplicated by us.

What it leads to, I think, is a stepping stone approach, an exploration of strategy, if you will, that assumes that we start off with a series of robotic capabilities and moves forward then thereafter towards other exploration objectives that may--or may not--involve human involvement. The best example that we have seen play before us in the last several years is the Hubble Space Telescope.

There was a $2 billion capability that, when launched in 1992, in fairly short order, was deemed to be, as a marvelous robotic capacity, a capability that was in need of an eye examination, if you will, a lens correction. And it was, at that time, determined to be a $2 billion piece of space junk.

A year later, we were able to send a shuttle flight with astronomers and other engineering capability that was resident among the astronauts there, to make that correction. That could not have been done remotely.

And so the human intervention that was necessary to adjust that, and all the servicing missions we've done since that time, have yielded the kind of astronomy breakthroughs and discovery--just in this past year--that we never dreamed imaginable. So that combination, that heel-toe kind of approach towards a strategy that utilizes robotic capabilities--much like we're going to do here in the coming months when we send the Mars Explorers in May and June of this year, intended for landing in January of '04--is to then consider all the efforts we've got to do prepare for then the follow-on kinds of exploration objectives.

But again, the reiteration of the first commitment to you: positively, we will continue to work together and refine the strategy, to assure that we do it with the least risk, but its greatest opportunity for exploration and discovery potential.

BROWNBACK: Thank you. And I look forward to working with you on that design of where we . . .

MCCAIN: The gentleman's time has expired.

O'KEEFE: Thank you, senator.

MCCAIN: Mr. Rohrabacher?

ROHRABACHER: Thank you very much. First and foremost, I'd like to identify myself with the remarks . . .

(UNKNOWN): Can't hear you.

ROHRABACHER: All right. Can you hear me now? First and foremost, I'd like to associate myself with the remarks and the concerns of Chairman Boehlert about the basic nature and the importance of the integrity of this commission's investigation and our oversight of that commission's work.

Second of all, I would like to just note that, at the memorial service down in Texas, I was touched particularly by the people of Texas and especially by the children of Texas who, as we went to this memorial service, they came out on the streets and roads and waved little American flags and had little signs up to encourage us. And it was very encouraging for our country.

So we recognize that there was a special bond between the children of America and our astronauts. And today, we're building. And we're going to make sure that we build a better future for our children.

And if there is going to be a better future for our children, we have got to have a viable space program that will keep them in the forefront of this great human endeavor of going into space and pioneering space. So let me have a few thoughts and then I'll have a few questions for you.

The hardworking and patriotic people of NASA have always understood and appreciated the risks with space exploration, especially manned missions. Unfortunately, in the past 17 years, we have been reminded of the dangers of human space flight with the destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1996--or '86, I should say--and now the Columbia.

Seventeen years ago, we took a step backwards for a few moments to take a look at that tragedy and pinpoint to our satisfaction what caused it and then correct those causes, at least the technical causes, of the loss. Today, I am confident that Admiral Gehman and his commission will get to the truths that will help us understand Columbia's fatal accident. However, many questions need to be addressed that transcend the immediate technical and managerial problems of this tragedy.

We're going to hear a lot about the technical end of it. But there's a lot of other questions that go way beyond that.

The lack of long-term goals or a unifying vision for America's space effort, for example, needs to be addressed to fully understand this tragedy. This failing, I believe, weakened the efforts that would have been taken to replace the shuttle system long before age became a factor. And we will find out, I believe, that age was indeed a factor.

Perhaps, Mr. Hollings is--or Senator Hollings--is right. Perhaps it's simple, what we're looking at. Perhaps it was the tiles, in terms of a simple answer. And a more complex answer might be facing it. It might even be age.

But this tragedy and this investigation, nonetheless, gives us an opportunity to revisit the fundamentals and make recommendations that will chart America's future space endeavors. NASA's leadership has faced and will continue to face the challenge of exercising responsible stewardship with limited resources, while providing a coherent blueprint of what can be accomplished and how it can be accomplished.

But hopefully, forward-looking strategies will lead us to incremental advances that will then permit us to achieve long-term objectives. A new propulsion system might be a good start, as well as perhaps a look at robotics and remote control on the part of NASA, a new commitment to that end.

But before we move forward, we must fully understand why these seven people perished. My question to you today is: the age factor. Was this, the shuttle's age, a 30-year old system, a major factor in this tragedy we're investigating today?

MCCAIN: Administrator O'Keefe?

O'KEEFE: Thank you, congressman. And again, I associate myself entirely with your observation that ultimately the investigation will be what guides us to that conclusion. And if that is a factor, you bet. That's exactly what we'll operate on.
Having said that, it is worth noting two really important factors on this. The Columbia, indeed, is the oldest--or was the oldest--of the four orbiters. It was delivered in the late 1970s. Its first flight was in 1981.

It is--it was--half the age of the average bomber aircraft that flew in Afghanistan just a year ago that prosecuted that very important effort that we were engaged in there. So the airframe condition on this, each time we go through this orbiter major modification I referred to in the opening statement, is essentially the equivalent of the same kind of effort the military Defense Department goes through, of tear down of every single element of the capability of the orbiter itself, its structural integrity inspected and examined very carefully, then rebuilt to modernize it to contemporary capability.

That particular effort had just been conducted, an 18-month tear down of the Shuttle Columbia, and delivered early last year, in advance of the March flight that went to Hubble, that did the servicing mission. STS-109 was the first flight of Columbia after that particular orbiter major modification effort which, again, is patterned very much after the depot kind of approach that's taken at all of the Defense Department-related assets, only even more exhaustively to conduct the upgrades.

This was the second flight after that particular tear down. So the age factor--again, you are exactly right. The investigation may yet prove or may demonstrate to us that there was a contributor there.

But in terms of our efforts to assure that not be a factor, again, it appears to be every element of diligence could be done to assure that. There was a previous flight that operated just perfectly, no difficulty whatsoever in Columbia. No structural defects upon return.

And upon every single orbiter flight return, we examine all of the elements of the shuttles themselves, the orbiters themselves, when we move it through the orbiter processing facility to assure that any damage, any structural problems, anything are detected. There was absolutely nothing wrong with Columbia that we could detect in that regard.

So when it flew on its second flight, it was in the same shape it was when it left the orbiter major modification program just a year before.

MCCAIN: Senator Breaux?

BREAUX: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. O'Keefe, thank you. And also congratulate you on the method in which you have handled this tragedy and the openness that I think we have seen from NASA in how you are approaching the investigation, both internally and with the external investigation as well.

Let me ask: do we have any idea of how many times the insulating tiles have come off a shuttle during launch? And how many tiles have actually come off during the history of the shuttle launches?

O'KEEFE: To the best of my recollection, sir, in our efforts there, it's no more than a half a dozen times that was specifically related to it. After each flight, there is always--again, as I mentioned just a moment ago to Congressman Rohrabacher, an assessment summary that's conducted to look at each element of the orbiter when it returns. There is also an inspection of the external tank, which as you are aware, when it reaches the upper atmosphere, it disintegrates.
The two solid rocket boosters, once expended, drop back into the ocean . . .

BREAUX: But on the tiles themselves, how many times have the tiles come off? And how many tiles have come off during the history of the shuttle launches?

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. At each flight, there is typically a ding or a scratch or whatever else from all of the various efforts that occur as they are re-entering, as well as on ascent. But I will provide for the record a full summary of all of the times, on each flight, that a tile has been missing or lost or whatever else.

But it was never considered to be significant, in terms of a safety of flight consideration that we've examined on the orbiters when we moved it through the orbiter processing facility to look at the condition of the orbiters after each flight. But we'll submit that for the record, sir.

BREAUX: If engineers on this particular case had determined that insulating tiles had, in fact, departed the shuttle at some point and that it was in an area that was important and very key, could the angle of attack on the re-entry of the shuttle been adjusted to deflect the heat?

O'KEEFE: That's a potential maneuvering capability. But again, there are more than 4,000 sensors aboard each shuttle orbiter. And if there were any indication that there were any abnormalities, as a consequence of tile loss or whatever else, they likely would have shown up during that 16-day orbiting mission.

More importantly, during the course of that time, recall that in each orbit, you're looking at a sunset and a sunrise every 90 minutes, which means every 16--16 times a day, the temperature variation on an orbiter or a shuttle flight varies by as much as 300 to 400 degrees--plus 200 degrees during the sunlight and minus about 150-plus during the darkness period of that 90 degree rotation or 90 minute rotation each time it orbits.

So that wide range of temperature variation, if there had been exposure, almost certainly would have shown up on one of those 4,000 sensors that are aboard the shuttle orbiter, to have given us an indication. The fact of the matter remains, there were no abnormalities that would suggest that problem until 8:53 the morning of February the 1st, on that Saturday morning.

BREAUX: But is there no way that these sensors or any other methodology would have determined if any of the tiles had departed the shuttle during the actual mission, before it returned to Earth?

O'KEEFE: We don't think so. Every effort that were made on previous flights to examine any structural damage or change or whatever else, using any kind of visual capabilities, were either inconclusive or not of the level of granularity that really gave us that much detail. And again, all of the supporting data would have also suggested if there were problems on it.

And the reality remains, over that 16-day mission--and again, the investigation may find some data that we're not aware of right now, because everything was locked down within a half an hour after the incident. If there is something else that emerges that suggests to the contrary, we're going to get to the bottom of it. But all the information we have now, and after the flight and after the examination of it, suggests no abnormalities that would have pointed in that direction at all.

BREAUX: What degree of certainty . . .

MCCAIN: The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Gordon?

GORDON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. O'Keefe. I'm glad you joined us today.

Before I move to discuss other issues, I just want to stress my concern that the investigation of the Columbia Space Shuttle accident ultimately must be perceived as objective and independent if Congress, the president and the American taxpayers are going to reach a consensus on how to move forward with our space program. It's no reflection on your or the admiral, but that's not going to be possible if there are lingering questions regarding the independence of the board.

As you know, I have raised this question for several days now. And having checked with your office this week and the NASA website this morning, there seems to be a clear disconnect from your statements about the board's independence and the rules you're laying down for the board.

Let me quote just a few examples of your rules, as Mr. Boehlert had earlier.

The current board not only includes NASA employees, but you also require it to be staffed by NASA employees, who will help write the board's final report, which goes to you. You require that the board must--and I quote--''schedule board activities, interim board reports and submit final reports in coordination with the NASA administrator, in accordance with the applicable NASA policies.''

Now Mr. O'Keefe, I'm afraid this won't pass anybody's smell test of independence. So please, let's move forward in a concrete way and put this bipartisan concern behind us.

Now let me turn to another issue that is troubling. As you know, there have been numerous warning flags regarding the health of the shuttle program in recent years. Just a few examples:

April 2002, Richard Blomberg, head of the Independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Plan, issued a blunt warning when he testified before this House subcommittee. And I quote--''In all the years of my involvement, I have never been as concerned for the space shuttle safety as I am now.''

A month earlier, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel gave you a report that stated--and I quote--''The current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of operations for the space shuttle.''

Yet, in spite of these warnings, you sent over a NASA budget request that cut the budget for shuttle upgrades to $500 million, even while finding $1 billion for new initiatives. Because of my concern, I asked Fred Gregory, who was then the NASA associate administrator for space flight, the following question at the same April 2002 hearing:

``Mr. Gregory, how would you support the Space Station in the event you lost the shuttle and the rest of the fleet was grounded for some period of time?'' Mr. Gregory responded, ``There would be no way to do that.''

Now I assume that such an admission would have kicked off an intense effort to develop a contingency plan for supporting the Space Station. However, at your press briefing Monday, you indicated that over the next few weeks, NASA would be working with the Space Station international partners to come up with a plan. You reiterated that earlier today.

Given the fact that you had numerous warnings and you knew the shuttle was grounded for 2.5 years after the loss of Challenger, I would assume Mr. Gregory's admission nearly a year ago would have been a wakeup call. So my questions are: did NASA prepare a contingency plan