BOEHLERT: I am pleased to welcome everyone here today for our annual review of NASA's budget. As I think everyone knows, this hearing was scheduled before the loss of the space shuttle Columbia on February 1st. Still, that tragedy casts a pall over our proceedings today, both emotionally and substantively. Emotional impact is obvious. And I suppose the substantive ramifications are as well. It's simply impossible to get a clear fix at this point on how much the human space flight program will require in the upcoming fiscal year.

That of course raises questions about the NASA budget as a whole. Still, we must begin to plan. And there are numerous relevant questions we need to ask today on topics other than the shuttle investigation or that program's budget. I should say, though, that having met with Admiral Gehman at length yesterday, I am more convinced than ever that the Columbia accident investigation board has the independence and resources it needs to conduct a broad, a thorough and a useful investigation.

The board does still need some additional members. And I expect that more will be appointed within the next week or so. I look forward to cooperating with Admiral Gehman as the committee conducts its own bipartisan investigation. The Gehman investigation could take as long as six months, although portions of it may be completed more quickly. And it's my understanding from Admiral Gehman that there will be a phased release of the reports. As they get significant information, it will be released.

But we have to assume that the shuttle may be grounded for an extended period. I understand that this morning Administrator O'Keefe will reveal how NASA intends to operate the International Space Station while the shuttle is out of commission. I look forward to being able to pursue any questions that plan may raise. Still, our primary focus this morning is on the FY '04 budget submission which itself raises a host of questions. I am particularly concerned that spending on aeronautics is slated to decline even as the budget calls for healthy increases for the agency overall. I find this somewhat baffling at a time when the need for aeronautics research is so apparent. Unless we're going to rename NASA and call it N'SA, I think the aeronautics budget needs to be rethought.

I should add that while we will be holding additional hearings on aeronautics research at both NASA and the Federal Aviation Administration in the coming weeks, including a full committee hearing on March 12th with the members of the congressionally created Aerospace Commission that was chaired by one of my predecessors at the committee, Bob Walker. I also wanted to be sure among other things that earth science research is getting its due. Earth science is a critical NASA mission of enormous scientific utility and vital to sorting out some key questions of practical as well as intellectual consequence such as the nature of global climate change.

And I know all of us here are interested in learning more about NASA's still conceptual plans for the orbital space plan. Obviously research related to replacing the shuttle seems more pressing with every passing day. Finally, I know that Administrator O'Keefe today will highlight NASA's personnel needs which have also been underscored in several general accounting office studies. I believe we must act swiftly to give NASA additional flexibility to recoup and retain employees.

I've worked with NASA for several months to come up with legislation to do that, legislation that quite frankly we had hoped to include in the omnibus appropriations bill. For various procedural reasons, that path did not work. But I do intend to introduce a NASA personnel bill within the next week or so.

So we have plenty to discuss this morning. And as always, I look forward to hearing from Administrator O'Keefe. As the administrator knows, we will start with 10 minutes of testimony from him and then go through as many questions as we can until 11 a.m. when we'll break for about an hour or so so members can attend an important briefing from Secretary Ridge. Then we'll resume for as long as we have to.

Mr. Hall?

HALL: Mr. Chairman, thanks for your opening statement, and I think it was a good statement. I may not be as convinced as you are that we have the independent thrust that we need. And I think that's something that you've taken the lead on. And I appreciate that. And I think we need to continue to work together. You have been very good at working with us on this side. Certainly those staffers have been good. They've worked together. We want to fall in behind this administrator and circle the wagons and keep the good space station going and, I think, try to go in one direction. I want to do that, and I've always wanted to do that as long as you went in the direction that I wanted to go in. And I guess that hasn't changed a lot for any of us. But I welcome Administrator O'Keefe to today's hearing. And I know that the members wish we could hear about NASA's new budget request under happier circumstances. But we have to deal with the hand that's dealt us. And that's what we're doing.

One of the committee's roles will be to understand the root causes of the Columbia accident and to put in safeguards to try to prevent such an accident from happening again. And I think we're looking for causation to protect the future more than we're looking for blame to curse the past. We've got to get together, and we've got to go forward. I think this committee and the leadership of the chairman of this committee and the leadership over on this side, and particularly Mr. Gordon who chairs the space subcommittee are going in the right direction.

We met yesterday as you did with Admiral Gehman, and he expressed the same determination, I think, that I've heard from almost everyone to get the cause of the accident and to identify any contributing factors. This committee shouldn't shrink from asking any of the tough questions. And I don't believe we're going to do that and questions of NASA and of ourselves to identify the proper corrective measures. Our next months, several months we'll need to determine the impact of the Columbia accident on NASA's budget and programs. And today we're going to try to understand the rationale for some of the budgetary cuts and enhancements that are part of this request.

For example, why is funding for aeronautics R&D cut over the next five years? Why is NASA's commercial technology program being terminated? And why does the shuttle upgrades budget continue to lag relative to the original plan while important upgrades continue to be deferred? These are questions, I think, that we hope to have answered today. And at the same time, the budget request finds room, I see, for some expensive new missions a year after OMB canceled the $1 billion Europa Orbiter mission because it was too expensive. NASA is now proposing to take a $4 billion mission to Jupiter's icy moons. Two years after OMB deferred work on the $1.4 billion U.S. crew return vehicle for the International Station, NASA is now proposing to spend what it estimates could be 10 times as much on the orbital space plane.

The Columbia accident has reinforced the priority of astronaut safety, and I continue to be concerned that we have not more vigorously pursued space shuttle crew survivor ability systems in the 17 years since the Challenger accident. And I join the group that can stand there for some blame on that because I've been here those 17 years. Weight issues originally related to the need to be able to lift space station nodules into orbit, that may not be relevant now that we're nearing the end of the space station assembly. And cost issues seem to be examined in the light of NASA's willingness to find money to undertake other expensive, new initiatives.

A lot of the same arguments apply to the U.S. crew return vehicle. The U.S. has a program to develop a U.S. CRV for the International Space Station. In fact, developing such a rescue vehicle is a U.S. responsibility under the international agreements governing the space station program. So those are things--and NASA has said the orbital space plane will supplement, not replace the space shuttle. We need to hear more about that. I don't believe I've used much over half of my time, Mr. Chairman. I want to yield the time I have remaining to the ranking member of the space committee, Mr. Gordon.

BOEHLERT: You have 13 seconds left, but we will allow Mr. Gordon a couple of minutes. And we'll also allow Mr. Rohrabacher a couple of minutes.

GORDON: Well, in my 13 seconds, let me just commend our chairman for setting up a truly bipartisan, bicameral approach to the investigation in the process that this committee's going to take and also for the proceedings that you've laid out today. If in addition to that you are giving me two extra moments, I will add my welcome to Administrator O'Keefe and commend you for the sensitivity that you and NASA have demonstrated in working with the families of the astronauts. I think you've done a good job.

Let me also commend you on the changes that you have made to what I think was pretty well considered universally a flawed charter document for an independent commission. I think you've made some positive changes. The problem that I see is that if the barn door is broken, just by putting a few coats of paint on it you don't fix the door. And I think we still have a broken door here. And I would hope that you would recommend to the president that he would follow the model, really, of Ronald Reagan in having both a truly independent commission, in fact, as well as in perception.

And I think the way to do that at this point is to take any or all of the current members, have them appointed as a presidential commission, add to those members an equal number of additional members that have expertise, given their own budget and have them report to both the president and to Congress. And I would hope that that again in an effort to get this truly independent commission in both in fact as well as perception that you would make that recommendation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.

BOEHLERT: Mr. Rohrabacher?

ROHRABACHER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And yesterday when we met with Admiral Gehman, I couldn't help but get a sinking feeling in my stomach when we saw this flight coming down of the shuttle. And the admiral mentioned to us that the Columbia had actually gone through 75 percent of what it had to go through in reentry. It was almost all the way home, and they didn't quite make it. And they'd already gone through the hottest part of the reentry. They'd already gone through 75 percent of the time of danger time of reentry. And then we lost them right there at the minute. We lost our astronauts, but we have a second chance now to do something to make sure that we put NASA on the right track and to make sure that these lives were not lost in vain. And I think it's up to all of us to take this very seriously, not just looking into what may or may not have happened, a mistake or a technical problem with the shuttle, but what we have to do with NASA to make sure it meets its potential in the future.

And the shuttle when it was first designed 30 years ago, it was an engineering marvel. But that was 30 years. And it is up to us now as a priority to find a cheaper and perhaps a safer way of getting into space to make sure that America remains the number one space power on the planet. And I am looking forward to working with all of you on both sides of this aisle and then with you, Mr. O'Keefe to try to come down to exactly what happened with the space shuttle Columbia, but also in trying to make sure we move forward and put America where we want it to be.

And just one note. In order to do this, we really have to be very, very cautious numbers. And that's what we're talking about today, the budget. And Mr. Hall brought up a point that I thought was important about different plans in the past with Europa, for example, which was a very expensive space endeavor. I noticed in the budget, and I mentioned this to you before, that it seemed to be a rather expensive project going to the ice moon of Jupiter. And I noticed in the budget it's a $3 billion project. But that's only for the first five years, and it's not scheduled to go up for another 11 years. And I would wonder how much more money we're going to spend on that project. So when every dollar counts and people's lives are at stake, we're going to have to ask some of the tough questions today. And I appreciate Ralph for bringing up the issue and some of the other issues that Bart Gordon will also bring up as well.

This is a bipartisan committee. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me my say.

BOEHLERT: Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher. And I couldn't agree more with you that we have to learn from the past as we plan for the future. And as Mr. Gordon has observed and Mr. Hall also, we have been working on a bipartisan basis to assure that the Columbia accident investigation board is independent, in fact, not just in name. And one of the most comforting comments I received yesterday in my rather lengthy meeting with Admiral Gehman was that--and I quote him exactly, "the board is completely independent and will remain that way." And I think that's very important. And I'm glad to see that the board will be expanded.

I also was pleased by the admiral's response to my question, who do you work for, Admiral. And he said, we work for several people. We work for the White House. We work for the Congress. We work for NASA. We work for the American people. But most of all, we're working for the families of the Columbia astronauts. That was the type of answer I was hoping for.

Mr. O'Keefe, let me say to you that how very favorably impressed we are with the manner in which you and the NASA family have been so open with the American people in sharing information about this tragic day in the lives of our nation, indeed the world. We are all with you and working with you to assure that the job you have is made as easy as possible as we go forward together for a better day. With that, Administrator O'Keefe.

O'KEEFE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. And thank you again for your very thoughtful statement. To you and Congressman Hall, to the other members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee today to discuss the president's fiscal year 2004 budget proposal of 15 and a half billion for NASA. The president's request demonstrates the administration's continued confidence in NASA's ability to advance the nation's science and technology agenda.

Let me first turn to a brief update, if you would, sir, on the Columbia accident investigation process that is underway at present. As you've all mentioned the opportunity to have spent time with Admiral Gehman yesterday. He's briefed several members of the committee. And again, I add nothing further to the commentary than that, which has been very thoughtfully presented in the opening statements by so many members here other than to add that we are committed to letting the facts and the evidence guide the deliberations. We are cooperating fully with the Columbia accident investigation board. Admiral Gehman and I have agreed that there is absolutely no limit to the resource capabilities and issues that we have available to the agency or to the federal government for the purposes of finding the truth and determining exactly what happened in this horrific accident.

In that regard, he has noted to me on several occasions, and I'm gratified to hear that he expressed that as well to members of the committee here that the professionalism and openness that each member of the NASA family have demonstrated in this case is in pursuit of those facts, that evidence and the truth of what happened. It is imperative we know the truth to determine what happened because we owe that to the families positively. We owe that to the American people who have entrusted this very important portfolio of exploration and discovery to us. And we owe it to our international partners who have participated so impressively, I think, in development of the International Space Station over the course of many years.

We have also and understand that there are a range of issues that we have to continue to work to make the corrections once the Columbia accident investigation board completes it deliberation to make corrections and return to safe flight that there is in this interim period, for however long that lasts, a requirement to continue to support the International Space Station. We have worked with our international partners, the 16 nations that we're all combined with, to develop this impressive capability of a laboratory and research capacity in space. And we've worked together to determine what that interim solution should be. And as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, as of yesterday, we were able to reach a very specific set of conclusions on that approach. Our deliberations have been very constructive, and all of the partners are acting like partners in the development of a partnership solution.

So as of yesterday, the final determination at this point in terms of how we proceed ahead is we've agreed to use the Russian Soyuz emergency egress space craft that are rotated twice a year to International Space Station to rotate the crew, the Expedition crews aboard the International Space Station for this interim period. So the next flight that will be going up in April, the end of April or early part of May, depending on the timing here, will be to bring back the current three members of the crew, Ken Bowersox, Don Pettit and Nikolai Budarin at that time and to bring up the crew of an Expedition Seven of two members, a U.S. astronaut and a Russian cosmonaut.

Those crew members have been named, and they are training now in Star City, Russia to maintain their proficiency on the Soyuz craft and are continuing the operations training and other operational preparations to continue the permanent presence aboard the International Space Station. We've also established a manifest for the flights of the Soyuz spacecraft over the course of the next year. There'll be another flight in October, as had been planned, to rotate that emergency egress capacity that is permanently affixed to the International Space Station. And we've agreed to accelerate the flights of the Progress autonomous, you know, not manned vehicles that bring up logistics, water, supplies, consumables to the International Space Station as well as spares and other requirements that are aboard for continued operation of the International Space Station.

We have agreed to a specific procedure to manifest only those mandatory elements which are required in order to maintain station as well as continue a science and research objections to the extent possible given the space limitations on Progress vehicles as well as on the Soyuz. At a minimum, we have also agreed that an additional two Progress vehicles, one in 2003 and one in 2004 will be accelerated in order to support at least for the foreseeable future a capacity to support the International Space Station at least for the next 18 months. There will again be a rotation of crews at the intervals in which the Soyuz vehicles are launched which will occur again in October and then again six months thereafter as has always been planned for the rotation of that capacity.

So the partnership has agreed to that. We are all in agreement on the approach on how we will proceed from this stage in order to maintain that capacity and to assure that we can operationally continue this important laboratory condition.

Let me turn, if you would, Mr. Chairman, to just a couple of highlights on the budget and the topic of discussion primarily here for today. The budget I would hope we will present and be convincing of is a responsible position of our highest priorities. It is credible. It builds in reserves for technically challenging programs and fully accounts for program costs. We believe it's compelling in that it enables new initiatives to tie to our strategic objectives which are contained and delivered as part of our strategic plan. The law requires that the strategic plan be produced in the fall. We've accelerated that and released it as part of this budget in February. It advances our mission goals through a stepping stone approach to future exploration objectives and provides transformational technologies and capabilities that will open new pathways.

And the proposal is about a new strategic direction for NASA that we have developed over the course of the last nine months and how we plan to shift resources towards longer term goals outlined in the mission statement and the strategic plan therein. Just to quickly highlight, the budget contains nine specific initiatives tied to mission goals that build on the strategic investments that were started as part of the fiscal year 2003 budget that the Congress just enacted a week ago.

They are first, Project Prometheus, which is to develop and demonstrate a breakthrough propulsion and power generation systems capability that will be at least a factor of 100 times greater than what we have been operating under since the beginning of our programs. The plan is to demonstrate that technology in the out years. And again, that's a proposition that we certainly will debate today and discuss to fuel a specific ambitious objective, as Congressman Rohrabacher mentioned in his opening statement, towards a capacity to demonstrate on orbit, multiple on orbit passes rather than one fly by which has been our typical approach that we've been restricted to given the limitations of power generation and propulsion capabilities we currently deal with.

It also includes a human research initiative to expand biomedical research and technology development to enable safe, long duration missions on the International Space Station as well as potential missions beyond lower earth orbit and potential medical benefits for millions here on earth. It includes an optical communications initiative, investment in revolutionary laser communications technology to demonstrate on a mission by transmitting large volumes of scientific information. This is akin to moving from the telegraph to a telephone in our approach on communications from space.

A beyond Einstein initiative which develops two Einstein observatories, LISA, a deep space, gravity wave detector and a Constellation-X mission probing of what happens to matter at the edge of the black hole, initiation of three probes designed to address key questions that Einstein left us: what power of the big bang, how did black holes form and grow and what is the mysterious energy pulling the universe apart at present.

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O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. There's no question in my mind that's what's occurring. And more importantly than my opinion or view, that's Admiral Gehman's view. And the members of his board are absolutely of that mind. And as a consequence, there is just a tremendous amount of information that's being analyzed now. But it is all being made available. And I am stunningly impressed by the professionalism of every individual in this agency who is participating to make sure this is an absolutely open and above board process where every, you know, scrap of information is available for examination to determine what happened here. We don't know. And they are narrowing down, I think through a very disciplined way on the investigation board, exactly what the causes could be and using precisely the methodology you described, very succinctly of trying to narrow down what those theories would be and then move ahead based on the preponderance of evidence on what they think the cause or probable cause would have been.

BONNER: Shifting gears a little bit because NASA obviously has many important issues on its plate. Many people, I think, over the years recall with fondness sitting around our television sets and watching with anxious breath watching the Apollo missions succeed, watching man take its first step on the moon. And over the years that have evolved, sadly it's taken Challenger and Columbia, the tragedies, to make us aware of the real danger and risk associated with these missions that have occurred in the years that have come since that time.

But one of the things that I think many Americans are looking for is what is the ongoing mission? And how do these space explorations continue to benefit those of us here on earth at this particular time? One thing that I'm particularly interested in as a member of Congress who represents the Gulf coast and the first district of Alabama is the work that NASA is doing with regard to red tide. It's something that affects, not only--we've lost a lot of species. It's also had a negative affect on the health of people along the Gulf coast. I would appreciate it if NASA could get me some additional information on that type of research. And I think that's just another example of where the research that you're doing with your agency and work with the other agencies like Noah (ph) is actually going to help benefit the quality of life here on earth.

I thank you very much for your very difficult job that you're doing. And I commend you on it very much.

O'KEEFE: Well, thank you, Congressman. I appreciate it very much. I would commend to you, sir, the strategic plan I referred to earlier which we have labored mightily to make sure it's readable. Most strategic plans are mighty fine doorstops. This one we really worked on for many, many months to be sure that it explains as succinctly and, you know, narrowly so it's not an intimidating size, that really lays out what the strategy is and the approach we're looking at. And in there is a specific discussion of the kind of earth science programs that we are engaged in in pursuit of climate change research initiative that the president expects that we will be supporting. And roughly half the assets that are necessary to complete that task are assets that NASA is employing for those purposes. To understand and protect our home planet as the primary first mission objective that we've stated incurs. But it is a comprehensive approach, and I'd be delighted to make sure you have further information on that specific activity of our science applications at your convenience. And we'll produce it right way.

BONNER: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

O'KEEFE: Thank you, Congressman.

CHAIRMAN: Congressman Wu has had to leave, and he wanted me to mention for the record that he will be submitting written questions to you about the nature of the ceramic tile and some of the problems there. And I would let everyone note that there will be--you can present written questions to the administrator at the end of the hearing or within a week afterwards. And we would expect, then, those questions to be answered by NASA. In the meantime,...

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. We (inaudible).

CHAIRMAN: ... Mr. Davis from Tennessee who is a freshman, I believe, a new member of our committee will proceed.

DAVIS: You're supposed to turn the speaker on, I guess. And one of my first questions that I'd like to ask as a member of this committee, make a comment as well. Five hundred some odd years ago, we started reaching out and found the 30 continents on the earth. And I know that as we look into the future with our space program, that we're looking to go to different planets and maybe even beyond that, other solar systems. And I certainly applaud the vision and the courage in those who work with NASA to reach out and to search beyond where we are today to go to the stars that some of those earlier folks looked to enhanced visions through telescope and identified some of those and quite frankly did quite a good job. We haven't done much of that even in modern time. We haven't found much greater in our stars than was there defined over the last several hundred years.

But about better citizens, I guess, most reverent citizens, Roger Crouch is an astronaut that was on space shuttle 83 and space shuttle 94. I know that the one in '83, a lot of concern as we saw one of the fuel cells, I think, that stopped on us, and we had to shorten that flight to four and-a-half days. And my grandson who was six years old was able to see number 94 go up, of which Mr. Crouch was on. I know that exploring space is something that's certainly important to all of us. As Kennedy said, the new frontier is not beyond the Mississippi River necessarily. But the new frontier for America is to walk on the moon. In 1969 as scout master, I sat with a group of young boy scouts who saw the landing on the moon and the pride that all of us in America had as we captured the first place as being in space.

And I understand as we do these flights with the shuttle that we do quite a bit of research, some that perhaps might even find a cure for an illness that we have. Perhaps new materials will make it more comfortable or easier to live here on earth. And I applaud that research as well. And I hope that we don't allocate funding searching for the stars when we still have a lot of searching to do for those of us who inhabit the earth.

But a question I have, and I hope that you might be able to answer this. I also watched, my wife being a teacher, as the Challenger in 1986 that we lost. And at that time, there had been some estimates when we first started talking about space flights, the possibility of losing one flight in 1,000 was something that we had to accept, that there were chances in flying into space. And when that one blew up, we decided it was one in 78. And now we have one in 57 as the record that we have for our space shuttle flights.

The question I have is that what accident rate is too low or too high for us? And I think that we need an honest debate on establishing some rate, accident rate over the next few years to be sure that those that explore beyond earth for Americans greater than we have. And I question whether or not we should continue to target dollars for somewhere beyond earth when we really ought to be putting more dollars in NASA or targeting more of those dollars for research that'll improve the quality of our life here on Earth.

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. No, I agree. There is no question that the risks involved in this activity are not inconsequential. We've seen that dramatically displayed. And there are no more, I think, courageous people that I have met in this last four weeks than the families of those astronauts. They are absolutely stunningly inspiring people. And they have dealt with this in a way that, frankly, I just don't know if any of us would have been as strong as they have been. It's an extraordinary effort. What they also have reminded me, though, each and every time I've had a chance to talk to them is that each time we're engaged in these activities of exploration throughout the history of humankind, there is always a risk attendant to that. Or else the safest way to do it don't go at all.

And I think the important question you've raised and one that I find really something that requires a soul search is at what point do you say (ph) the potential cost of exploration, going there to a place that is not typically gone to or gone to at all, that at what point do you say it is not worth that potential risk. And if that weren't the case, I think as you started at the very beginning of your commentary, we would not have achieved what we have as human beings over the course of, you know, lots of exploration objectives. Lewis and Clark would have quit in the first few days. Magellan would never have taken the trip instead of coming back with only three of the original crew members he began with. I mean, there are just a number of different events in human history that if you look to, it really has to be worth that price.

And that's the more important point that I think you've identified that is really occupying my thought on this question of at what stage is the yield of what it is we think we can gain by the continued exploration relative to what that risk is once we manage that to the lowest level we can within the limits of human frailty.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator. And one wonders what type of investment in the ice moon of Jupiter is going to return to us and what the total expense is going to be over the whole trip, which we haven't gotten into yet. But maybe we will later on.

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN: We now have Mr. Feeney from Florida, another freshman that has been very active in his own state government, now has come to share his talents nationally.

FEENEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. O'Keefe for again appearing before us. And I understand that the overwhelming issue that all of us are interested in is the investigation and hopefully the cause of the tragedy which we can remedy. But we still have to do a budget. And this is a budget hearing. And so as opposed to trying to force this watched pot to boil quicker as we try to get to the bottom of the investigation, I'd like to focus my questions on budget related matters.

How and what do you anticipate--and I understand there are a lot of things that are still up in the air related to short and long-term planning as a consequence of the disaster. But how do you plan to utilize the shuttle and the International Space Station work force at Kennedy Space Center in particular, but elsewhere as well during the stand down period for the shuttle fleet? Do you see any immediate reductions in these work forces because of the stand down? If so, when do you anticipate those decisions would be made? And what can we do for the employees that may be affected?

O'KEEFE: Well, as our experience, again, has been that each time there is any anomaly that we see that would compromise safety of flight, we have done the stand down. As recently as June to October of last year was an extended stand down as we worked through the fuel line crack issues that we had detected on one orbiter to make sure they weren't on others. And during the course of that time, that required, I think, a continued activity on the part of all of the folks in the work force, both at NASA as well as the contract community that support the launch activities. It is a lot of busy, a lot of work still continuing to go on. And we're anticipating as soon as possible returning to safe flight. As the recommendations of the board are released to the extent that that permits us to do so, we shouldn't see any diminution of that.

Right now, the next orbiter that was to have launched in March is Atlantis. It was stacked and ready to roll out to the launch pad. We are now destacking the orbiter to assure that everything and anything that needs to be examined here in the course of our investigation and the Gehman board's review of said investigation is examined to assure safe flight. So there's plenty of things to keep lots of folks busy. And they are very, very diligently working all that as well as continuing to receive the International Space Station components that are coming and delivering to Kennedy. I think at the end of next month the node two, which is the primary configuration component that permits the attachment of all the international partner modules in the future is due to arrive at Kennedy. And that'll take the better part of a year of testing and check out and assuring that all those parts are compatible with all the other components that are involved there.

So there's a lot to do. And there's an incredible attention to detail that's going on at each of the centers, particularly at Kennedy as well in doing this as well as the reception of all the debris that has been trucked to Kennedy to lay out to give us a better understanding of what could possibly have happened on this flight. So a lot of busy activity going on. And a lot of folks really attending to it and spending an awful lot of time above and beyond any normal work day. They are really dedicating themselves to it every day, and we're very proud of them.

FEENEY: But no immediate intended...

O'KEEFE: I don't know what we could do without them.

FEENEY: Wonderful.

O'KEEFE: You know, we couldn't continue.

FEENEY: Mr. O'Keefe, while we wait for a fix to the shuttle problem, should Congress decide to appropriate additional resources for an expedited development of the orbital space plane, could we shorten the time frame and get into action before 2010 in a meaningful way, in your opinion? And what would it take in terms of resources to do that?

O'KEEFE: Might be able to, and that's exactly what we're looking at now. We're trying to--you know, the orbital space plane program office and our aeronautics technology enterprise folks are looking at that very, very carefully right now to try to see what permutations (ph) of the schedule we could look to to accelerate that activity. So we should have some answers to that in a relatively short order.

FEENEY: And finally, can you describe the collaborative efforts between the Department of Defense and NASA with respect to the next generation launch vehicles? Are we working well together? Are there additional things that we need to give you in terms of tools and resources to work with DOT in that regard?

O'KEEFE: It's doing exceptionally well. We have a standing partnership arrangement that we work with all the element of the Defense Department, particularly the Air Force and the Strategic Command, the defense research and engineering activities in order to really contribute heavily to the activities of the next generation launch technologies. Dr. Ron Sega who is a former astronaut, as a matter of fact, is the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. We have worked very, very closely and very collaboratively on hypersonics capabilities, a range of different programs that they see applications for that we also will view for the future. And we're looking to accelerate that. It's a very close, extremely professional and personally rewarding arrangement and relationship that we have that I think is doing nothing but yielding great dividends. So we're going to continue on that effort as well.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator.

O'KEEFE: Thank you, Congressman.

CHAIRMAN: And we have Mr. Bell from Texas, the 25th congressional district of (inaudible).

BELL: Thank you, Mr. Chair. And actually from Houston, Texas and so the impact of the space shuttle tragedy has been fully felt in my district. And I very much admire the way that the agency has conducted itself and the way you have handled the situation personally. And I want to say that. And obviously it's extremely important to people in my district to see the space program move forward. I wanted to try to achieve some clarity on something that you said early on in your testimony here today in response to a question from the chair. And I think I understand what you mean, but I think it's awfully important as we move forward and as this discussion continues about where the space program is going.

And you were talking about the space station and what would drive the decision to dim the lights, I think was your expression. And talked about any safety consideration could lead to the dimming of the lights. And what I think is very important as this debate moves forward is that people not forget that there are huge inherent risks involved with manned space flight and that astronauts willingly accept those risks when they decide to take part in the program. And so what I'd like for you to perhaps touch on is when you talk about safety considerations--and I think everybody realizes that every effort is made to make every mission as safe as possible. But what kind of safety considerations are we talking about that could lead to a dimming of the lights?

O'KEEFE: Well, again I agree with you entirely that the ethos of the astronaut core and the cosmonaut core is that you take every, single alternative before you ever abandon anything. There is no doubt about it. There is a very committed, extremely professional, well trained, extraordinarily impressive group of people who are committed to that set of objectives. There's no doubt about it. The kinds of things that I think would compromise safety in these cases--and we've got multiple scenarios we've worked through and simulations of what could happen on International Space Station to look at each of the potential permutations (ph) of what could occur that would necessitate abandonment. And it is a very low number of circumstances. There's no doubt about it.

A fire aboard the International Space Station in and of itself may not necessarily necessitate abandonment. If it can be contained and worked and they've all been trained to deal with those kinds of questions, then they do just that. And it's the last possible alternative they consider is to leave. The point that I think the chairman raised that I think is particularly relevant in this case is that our margin that is necessary to support sustained, permanent presence aboard International Space Station until we return to shuttle flight is dependent upon, not only the Soyuz capsule always being attached so that they have an emergency egress capacity, but also the continued Progress flights, the resupply flights, the autonomous unmanned vehicles that bring aboard water, consumables, spares, logistics capabilities. If for whatever reason--and I think this was an important point that Congressman Gordon raised--that that succession of flights is not achievable, then the idea of leaving them there for a sustained period of time without the capacity to support them is something we would have to consider seriously as a basis upon saying time to dim the lights and come on back.

And again, that's a decision we'd make as a partner in partnership among the 16 nations involved. And there's a reticence, deep reticence to want to leave that unmanned for any period of time because of the uncertainties of what could occur when there's no individual aboard. But nonetheless, it's something I think we have to look at as an act of consideration to recognize what the challenge and risk is of continuing this activity. I think you hit the nail right on the head.

BELL: You also talked about taking a stepping stone approach in this budget. And the orbital space plane is talked about or addressed in the budget. And the space station is addressed. I assume those are some of the stepping stones to which you refer. And I'm curious as to how the shuttle investigation may impact those stepping stones. What effect could that investigation have on any of the overall plan or budget?

O'KEEFE: It is pure speculation on my part to determine what it is Admiral Gehman and his board may or may not come up with. It would be a wild guess. And I have no idea exactly what the contents of that potential set of recommendations could be. Nonetheless, I think it's important that we position ourselves to look at what shuttle monetization, maintenance, upgrade and continued operations requirements we would have. We are going to convene in March, as a matter of fact, with a group of folks that all look at every possible upgrade approach. And we had planned this prior to February 1st to get together to think about what's it going to take to extend the service life or maintain the service life of this asset through the next decade potentially.

On the orbital space plane, again there's a set of options we're looking at and have to examine in terms of what adjustments to the schedule might be possible as we work through this. Continuing discussions with our partners in terms of what it would take to continue or accelerate the number of Progress flights, the number of Soyuz flights that would increase the crew capacity aboard international station. All those certainly are on the table and under consideration. And as those recommendations come out, we'll figure out which options to proceed with so we're not starting from scratch on the day that everything arrives as a report at that time. So we're going to try to be as agile as we can in responding to it because our objective is to return to safe flight as quickly as we can.

CHAIRMAN: The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Gutknecht, the distinguished vice chairman of the science committee.

GUTKNECHT: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. O'Keefe, thanks for coming here today. These are difficult times. I want to throw out a couple of ideas, issues. And I'd like to have you respond to them. Then I have a very specific question. Shortly after the disaster, there was a professor, I believe, from Maryland. And I'm sorry, I did not write down his name. But he raised a very troubling question for me. And he asked the question, I think, to the audience what have we really learned in the last five years with all of the money that we've spent that we would not have learned here on earth. And I think that's a question that NASA's going to have to help us answer. I mean, we've grown a lot of crystals out there, and we've done a lot of experiments. And I know that even some high school students from my home town have done some experiments. But at the end of the day, it seems to me those are very, very expensive experiments. And I think we have to account to the taxpayers in terms of what we have actually learned in the last five years.

The second point that I think is important--and this all causes us to sort of rethink what we're doing and why. And that is the difference between using human beings in space, manned space flights and robotics. That's been referred to earlier. Now obviously when we start doing these deep space probes, we're going to have to use robots because human beings could not survive the trip. I think in terms of costs versus benefits I think we need to take a very sober analysis as we go forward. Because the one thing we have learned, two things we have learned in the last month, painful lessons, first of all, putting human beings into space is extremely expensive. And the second is, traveling at 16 times the speed of sound is extremely dangerous. And so as we go forward, I think we have an obligation to answer those kinds of questions to our constituents. And finally, a very specific question. As we was mentioned by my colleague from Florida, he and I are among the few, I think, on this committee who also serve on the budget committee. And we're currently trying to squeeze about $2.5 trillion worth of requests into about a $2.2 trillion budget. And that is not going to be easy.

And so in terms of the budget side of it, I want to ask very specifically, as part of this committee's responsibility we must have complete information and records of funding requests from your agency. Will you provide for the record all of NASA's submittals to OMB and the OMB budget guidance and direction to NASA for the space shuttle program and any related accounts since 1997?

O'KEEFE: Well sir, I can respond to each of the three points you've raised here. The first one is what have we done. Just last night, as a matter of fact, I happened to see a package that impressed me to no end that responds to this question in a way I hadn't thought of. In the last seven years, over 1,500 journal articles have appeared that are exclusively owing to human space flight research. And there is a specific activity or comment that was made by Dr. Michael DeBakey who is the world renowned heart surgeon who says the human space flight research studies have produced knowledge of tremendous importance that has been of use and practical use in a number of different areas that would not have been possible were it not for these achievements.

And he has developed a new heart pump, for example, that he attributes directly to what research was attained as a result of the human space flight experiences we've had just in the last five years. So there are lots of others, and I'll provide those for the record that would summarize...

GUTKNECHT: Well Mr. O'Keefe, I think it's good that you would provide them for the record and for this committee.

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir.

GUTKNECHT: But it seems to me that one of the functions that NASA probably is going to have to do a better job of in the coming years is explaining to the American taxpayers, you know, what exactly are they getting in return. Now we know that in the early days we got enormous returns in terms of computer technology, telecommunications, a whole lot of areas that were expanded geometrically because of the space agency. And in recent years, though, we don't see that kind of real benefit to the average consumer. And so, it's important you share with us. But I think it's even more important now that you share it with the American people.

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. Point very well taken, Congressman. I'll positively redouble the efforts to work that through. You again, made an excellent point. The second issue you raise is humans versus not kind of approach to what we do. Again, I think it's not an either or. It's how they compliment each other. And a statistic I saw just the other day that basically translates to about $20 per American is what we spend for human space flight activities. That's what it ultimately costs in terms of the amount of dedication of tax resources or resource efforts towards that. We've got to determine whether that's too high or not. There's no doubt about it and make an ascertation of more importantly, rather than its expense is the horrific risk that we run by humans being involved.

And again, I think that's a case where in the course of human exploration, had we exercised extreme caution in every case, the Wright Brothers 100 years ago would have never done what they did. And we wouldn't be in air travel today. So, you know, we've got to look at this in context. But it's an important one. And I think you raise a seriously important question that we have to do some deep soul searching about.

The last issue of what did we submit and where have we been, we're going through the audit trail now trying to resurrect all the data and information, working with our colleagues within the administration to ascertain how to respond to that. I'll get back to you very shortly on that question. We're working through exactly what the administration will provide in that context by coordinating with that. We're trying to gather the data now.

GUTKNECHT: Our staff will follow up with you. Thank you.

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired. Well, there's some good news from the briefing from Secretary Ridge on homeland security. The homeland terrorism alert has been downgraded from code orange to code yellow. The briefing is ongoing. And as you might suspect, it's dealing with some very important subject matter. At least there's some good news to put on the table.

I understand, Mr. Administrator, that in my absence there was a little bit of excitement generated in an exchange with Mr. Weiner. I understand in his enthusiasm he went a little far in comparing this to the Challenger situation. There were experts in that case who were clearly saying you should not, NASA should not, launch this vehicle. Here we have the much more ambiguous situation of engineers speculating about a wide variety of possible problems that they themselves characterize as unlikely but worth considering. And it's not clear at all what the remedy might be.

I'm not suggesting that these e-mails weren't important or shouldn't be heeded. I am suggesting that we need to avoid simplistic comparisons, and we need to investigate how the e-mail traffic from this mission may have differed from that of other missions. And as the administrator has said, we need to look hard at whether judgment calls were being made at the appropriate level in the agency with the appropriate amount of information.

I think it's a little bit premature to do any finger pointing at this stage. We're all searching for the same sometimes allusive facts.

So Mr. O'Keefe, do you feel at this point that any of the released e-mails should have been seen by you at the time they were written?

O'KEEFE: Again, that would be an extraordinary volume. And given the circumstances of my limited intellectual capacity, I'm not sure I could have digested all that I've seen just in the course of the last three weeks during the course of operations. Again, everybody's expected to step up in these cases during an operational activity. And it appears for all the world that that exchange was going on. And exactly the right kind of scenario analysis and simulation of cases does not appear to have been something that was a lingering question.

There was resolution to each of these points. And again, that's exactly the right kind of commentary that ought to be going on. As it pertains to the spirited exchange in your absence or while you were here, I can assure you, every exchange has been spirited. And I've enjoyed every one of them, sir.

CHAIRMAN: Let me ask you what was the highest level which the e-mails were reviewed? And are you convinced in looking back--and hindsight is always 20-20--that it was the appropriate level for decision making?

O'KEEFE: That's a good question. On this particular circumstance, which again narrowly deals with the scenario and simulation of the question of what do you do on landing with one flat tire or two flat tires as I understand the nature of the exchange. And what could lead to these problems leading up to that landing? That was vetted all the way through to the point of some very senior folks at Langley as well as at Johnson. It was at the mission operation directorate level that was specific activity engaged in. And at one point, even raised, I think, to the center director at Langley Research Center.

And I was just down at Langley two days ago to discuss with all our colleagues there how we're working through the investigation and did have an opportunity to exchange a bit with some of the folks who were engaged in this particular dialogue as it pertains to the landing options that might have otherwise occurred. And they were all of a mind that indeed that discussion that was going on was exactly the kind of discussion that goes on for every kind of mission. And it's the nature of the same debate. And that it was resolved at the appropriate levels. I want to reserve on that question until I see the Gehman recommendations as to whether or not that was the appropriate level to deal with. And I really want to--I've got to look at this very, very carefully.

But in this particular case, the folks who participated were pretty senior at lots of levels within the two centers that were engaged in the activity and were aware of the activities that were going on and were making judgments about what they thought the preponderance of evidence would suggest as a safety of flight consideration. You know, we can argue with the nature of the judgment and whether it should have been different or not. But the question of whether it was iterated and resolved as they worked through it, the benefit of a lot of knowledge was exchanged. That's very, very clear.

CHAIRMAN: So at this point, you feel that the appropriate level did deal with the e-mails and that they should not have come to the administrator at the time. It was not necessary in view of all the other responsibilities.

O'KEEFE: Yes. Indeed. But again, I'll be guided by the Gehman board's view of exactly what is the appropriate call in those circumstances. But it sure appears as though the right discussions at the right levels and resolving it at the right circumstances were engaged. And that indeed the resolution was no safety of flight consideration. And that was what was reported up the chain throughout the course of the operation on several different occasions of having done their jobs and worked through it professionally, diligently and accountably. They've reached conclusions based on the preponderance of evidence of what compromise to safety of flight would be involved and so advised everyone throughout that chain.

So, you know, again as we work through this to the extent there is a different systemic challenge or management problem that would be identified, I'm going to be guided by the Gehman board's view of that question.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

O'KEEFE: Thank you, (inaudible).

CHAIRMAN: And as we all will be. And that's why I think it's particularly important that we continue to emphasize the independent nature of the Gehman commission.

O'KEEFE: Indeed.

CHAIRMAN: In that regard, let me turn now to Ms. Woolsey.

WOOLSEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. O'Keefe. I believe through this process since the tragedy that you've played a great role in helping our country and our nation through this tragedy and with a lack of defensiveness that I really respect.

O'KEEFE: Well, thank you very much.

WOOLSEY: But you know what? We're at a new place right now with this e-mail. And I think there are questions the public want answered. I don't think we can pacify them now that they've read what the staff was questioning. And I can say just for myself that supporting the NASA budget is going to depend on (inaudible) feeling absolutely sure that we've gotten real answers to those questions that were asked and that came out of that e-mail. I mean, could the shuttle crew have survived had they known ahead of time that maybe they should abort the mission and come back before that area of concern was stressed through the entire mission?

O'KEEFE: Sure.

WOOLSEY: And could they have--I mean, I don't know the answers to these. I wouldn't even begin to know. But I know if I don't, the public doesn't. And they want to know these things. Could the crew have been able to repair the area at the space station or something? Could the crew have prepared to escape upon return if they'd known in time? The public has to know this. And they want to know it before--and I want to know it--before we authorize another budget.

O'KEEFE: Absolutely. No, there's no question. We really have to work through this and be responsive. We will be accountable. We will be absolutely honest about what we think of the assessments here and any mistakes or judgment calls made as we work through this is what we'll be guided by the Gehman board's recommendations and findings in those cases. So there's no question.

In this particular case--and again, this is a one aspect of many, many, many different correspondences that went on during the course of operations and everything that led up to it dealt very specifically with the issue of whether the orbiter could land on a flat tire or not or two flat tires or without the gear being up or down. That's the kind of debate and discussion we want to see go on. I want to encourage, I want to keep folks feeling like they can do in the course of this. And my, I think, commitment in this particular case to all of our colleagues around the agency is that's precisely the kind of discussion that needs to go on. And we will indeed be accountable for that answer.

Could they have responded to something? Well, to the extent that there is--again, there was a determination made that a safety of flight consideration was supported by the evidence involved and judgment calls made that said it was the problem. The crew would have been advised any number of different scenarios would have been activated. But the fact of the matter is, on all of the 4,000 onboard sensors on Columbia, none of them indicated that there was a problem in this particular area. And until eight fifty-two that morning, no failure was detected.

So as a consequence, a lot of scenarios and what ifs were going on, but no evidence to support that by a sensor suggesting a problem or anything else. Now, as the information is certainly coming out at this juncture, as we're continuing to make sure we look at every single scrap of anything, we will be accountable for that. We will indeed find out what the cause was driven by their findings. And we will make corrections to assure that within the limits of human frailty, this never happens again.

WOOLSEY: Well, OK. I appreciate that because the public is more interested in what action was or was not taken, what prevention in the future versus participation. We need to know that.

O'KEEFE: Absolutely. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely.

WOOLSEY: OK. Now I want to go off on another subject.

O'KEEFE: Yes, ma'am.

WOOLSEY: And the subject is who's going to be our workers in the future for the space program with everybody aging. I know our chairman has legislation to shore up our work force.

O'KEEFE: Indeed.

WOOLSEY: But one with the aging population of your workers and two with, you know, the challenge of what's just happened. And possibly people won't be coming to NASA to go to work. What are you doing about that?

O'KEEFE: Well, thank you.

WOOLSEY: Is it a problem?

O'KEEFE: It is. It is an issue that we are most concerned about. And indeed this is a maturing work force. I am 47 years old. I am the average age of the agency.

WOOLSEY: You're a baby.

O'KEEFE: I know I look a lot older than that. But that's my actual (ph) age. But as a consequence, it is, you know, a real challenge when you look at and you really shred the information of what the maturity level, if you will, of the work force is at this juncture. Is we have three times as many folks who are scientists, engineers and technologists who are over 60 as we have under 30. And so as a consequence, the better part of a quarter, approaching a third, of our work force will be eligible to retire in the next five years.

Last June, we submitted to the Congress--the president initiated legislation to look at a whole range of personnel authorities that take the best practices that have been enacted by Congress and implemented by agencies of the federal government in the last decade and utilizing each of those best practices to give those authorities to NASA to recruit, retain and to continue to develop the opportunities for engineering, scientific and technology related fields to encourage to come to NASA. Every opportunity we have. And that's one of the reasons education is a dominant part of our mission objectives now to inspire that next generation of explorers that we've just adopted as a way to look at this is to really go out there and actively encourage interest in what we do.

And there's no question the interest level is high. We need to get about the business of, not only recruiting, but also retaining and bringing in mid-level entry of folks within other experiences. All of those opportunities the chairman has very impressively sponsored as part of his effort to help us move forward, get those tools and be able to deal with what I think is a looming set of issues. We're not there yet, but we certainly have an opportunity to shape and affect that outcome in the years ahead if we do this diligently. And the chairman's sponsorship has been most helpful.

WOOLSEY: Right.

CHAIRMAN: The gentlelady's time has expired. The gentleman from Oklahoma?

LUCAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Director. I know that we focused a great deal on the shuttle here, but still it's a 30 year old design flying people on the back of what are in effect ballistic missiles, a 40 year old concept. In your budget request, you request $550 million for this coming year on the orbital space plane concept. And if you could answer the following questions in whatever order you choose to. What do we as the U.S. government and American taxpayers get for that $550 million this year? If this effort is successful, and I hope it would be, how long before we'll have an operational orbital space plane? What would the total cost be when we get to that point? And maybe the science for a single stage is not achievable. Will it be a single stage, a two stage, or is it still going to require those ballistic missiles?

O'KEEFE: OK. Well, $550 million in this coming year as well as in each successive year hereafter, what it primarily covers is the cost of technology demonstration of the X-37 right now, which is under development and in production. It is a physical asset that you can go put your hands on in Palmdale, California that the Boeing folks are working on that is a technology demonstrator of the maneuverability characteristics we seek in the orbital space plane.

What is the next stage in this, and what part of that 550 million covers as well is the cost to design and select a specific set of characteristics and work through all those requirements on the part of several contractors so that the ultimate objective we select is not just a tech demo, but an operational asset. And so that's partly what that covers as well.

When operational? The current plan is we seek to do that by the end of this decade. Part of what's been a dialogue here today is our efforts in working with the orbital space plane program and the aeronautics technologies enterprise within NASA to see if we can find differing schedules to accelerate potentially to look at what it would take in order to produce that particular asset sooner.

Total cost? Don't know until we select what the competitive design is. There are at least three or four different approaches that could be used. Some have wings. Some don't. There's all kinds of different methods that contractors are looking at and will be looking to respond to that will then give us the answer to that cost. But before we make that decision, the Congress will know what that cost estimate is of the general parameters of a view where we go before we make a contract award. And that's partly what I think Congressman Rohrabacher was referring to a little bit earlier in terms of when are we going to get to a stage of understanding that. And the answer to that is within the next 12 to 18 months of selecting what design you'd ultimately select to go that route. And that'll give a cost number.

Will it be single or multiple stage? The initial idea is to launch it off an expendable vehicle. So yes, indeed it is not a reusable launch vehicle asset that would not use chemical propellant. That's no question. It's going to be still tethered to the exciting eight and-a-half minutes it takes to get into lower earth orbit that is very typical of the way we have done business in the past. And there's no doubt about it. It's tethered to that because the objective of the orbital space plane is primarily to test its maneuverability, its durability features, its flexibility on orbit.

The next generation launch technologies approach that we've also included and is funded or proposed subject to your approval is an approach to look at what it would take to get out of the expendable launch vehicle business and start looking at reusable launch vehicles that can launch and land just like aircraft do. That's a ways away. We tried to go down that road a few years ago, I'm advised, with the X-33 program and found that it required a suspension of the laws of physics in order to accomplish the task. We don't know how to do it yet. So we're trying to beat each of these technical obstacles one at a time in order to achieve that ultimate objective down the road.

LUCAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

O'KEEFE: Thank you, Congressman.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. (inaudible)?

(UNKNOWN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

O'KEEFE: Thank you, sir.

(UNKNOWN): And thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for giving us so much time today. I just have a couple of questions I wanted to run past you. Representative Woolsey raised the issue about work force issues within NASA. And I guess another component of that would be among your suppliers, for example, with the space shuttle operations being suspended for the time being. There are many suppliers such as American Pacific that produces the aluminum perchlorate for the shuttle's solid rocket motors. And there's a question if they're going to be able to sustain their work force during this period of suspension of operation. It's my understanding they're the only supplier of this material within the United States.

Has NASA been able to give some thought to if there's anything to address these companies that may be facing these layoffs that may be part of your critical supply chain and issues we can do to make sure we don't run into problems with that?

O'KEEFE: Sure. As a matter of fact, this is one of several. And I appreciate your point that we are faced with a very limited supply because, you know, it's not a large scale, you know, production run of anything that we are engaged in.

(UNKNOWN): Right.

O'KEEFE: And throughout NASA, we aren't a manufacturing house. I mean, it's single digits of anything. We don't do anything by volume. And as a consequence, it is a singular, stand alone set of programs each and every time. The objective really I look at for the industrial base is to try and identify where those long poles in the tent are, for example, of supplier requirements. We are just beginning to get down that road to look at what they may be. But we again remain very optimistic that if we can find--if the findings are released by the independent Gehman board here in the time ahead, that we can determine what those corrections are, get back to safe flight and only when we are assured that those operational corrections are sufficient to guarantee within the limits of human frailty our ability to get back to safe flight.

(UNKNOWN): Right.

O'KEEFE: I'm very optimistic we can still attain that. To the extent we can't, again the industrial base issues we've got to look to were being guided by the four primary space flight centers to look at what those initial requirements are that may be perishable in those cases. And so, we're starting down that road now to start thinking about what those are, including the very case you raise as well.

(UNKNOWN): I'm glad to hear that because I do think that's just an issue that deserves some good attention. One more question. I know you've talked about this a lot today. But just real quick. I know last November the integrated space transportation plan that NASA laid out in its budget amendment for the FY '03 NASA budget, it outlined an approach to insuring the country has human access to space in the near-term with what was going to be number one, a safer and more efficient space shuttle, number two, an orbital space plane to support the space station and number three, a long-term plan for developing a revolutionary launch system for the future with next generation launch technology with that program.

So the question I'd ask you is, at this point, do you interpret that is the orbital space plane intended to be a compliment to the shuttle by giving alternative crew access to and from the space station? Or is it intended to replace the shuttle? And secondly, is the orbital space plane going to be used in existing technologies, or is it going to require continued development of new technologies? And if so, what's your sense of it? Is it going to delay development over a period of time, potential delays? Just wondering how you see those programs meshing with each other in the near term.

O'KEEFE: Sure. And thank you for a very important question. And I think we've really done a lot of soul searching leading to this proposal that was submitted first, as you correctly cite, as part of the November budget amendment that the president submitted and now reaffirmed as part of our fiscal year '04 proposal that the president has submitted along with the '04 budget.

And that is that indeed it is a compliment to the space shuttle effort specifically as a way to think about how we can do dynamic, very flexible, extremely maneuverable crew transfer requirements that would bring folks back and forth to International Space Station as again, flexibly as we can. Because among the things that shuttle is, being flexible and dynamic in terms of its ability to launch on near, no notice is not one of its characteristics. It takes a lot of time, a lot of energy, a lot of effort. And indeed 30 days before launch, we've got to roll out the orbiter, make sure everything checks out.

(UNKNOWN): Right.

O'KEEFE: It goes through an exhaustive effort. It is not a flexible asset in that regard. So using it as a remarkable cargo and asset carrying capability given the fact that it is the payload bay is what we need in order to continue building the International Space Station. We can't do it, as has been pointed out here in today's discussion, we can't do it any other way. There is no other asset we have in order to launch and bring to space station the components, the modules, the capabilities, the laboratory capabilities for science and research in any other method. So we've got to have that capability to carry that. But in terms of a crew capability, the orbital space plane can easily supplement for that purpose so we can, you know, devolve more towards cargo transportation requirements for shuttle and more for crew transfer requirements for the orbital space plane.

The aspect that we're looking to--and again, this is in part the discussion with Mr. Lucas here a moment ago--is we're looking to identify a couple of technical limits that we currently have to live with, which is maneuverability and the capacity to launch on a little more of a near notice that would give us some more dynamic flexibility in scheduling. Those are the kinds of things we seek to overcome with the orbital space plane.

So rather than trying to look at a whole range of different technical limitations, we're trying to narrow it to a couple and achieve maneuverability purposes in order to get some flexibility in the asset so it has some power generation capability which the shuttle currently does not while it's on orbit to any really great degree of adjusting its capabilities. And to have a capacity in order to assure transfer back and forth on as immediate a notice as we possibly can to assure the safety of, not only the crew aboard, but also on International Space Station. So we're trying to narrow those purposes so we're not trying to have an asset that does all things for all people. Instead you beat those technical limits one at a time and do it in a very disciplined way.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.

(CROSSTALK)

O'KEEFE: Thank you, Congressman. Appreciate the thoughtful questions.

CHAIRMAN: Dr. Gingrey?

GINGREY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. O'Keefe, thank you for your patience and candor in responding to these very important questions. The committee has some concern over aeronautic R&D funding cuts. You know, the administration's FY '04 budget request for NASA's aeronautics technology program is $959 million. But once a core program within NASA, the administration plans to cut funding for this program by five percent over the next five years. And this just sort of exacerbates a 10 year period of cuts.

Today NASA's only spending half of what it expended in 1998 for aeronautics. And these needs were highlighted in the final report of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, a congressionally created commission chaired by former Science Committee Chairman, Bob Walker. And this report conclude, as we approach the 100th anniversary of powered flight, the commission urges the president and Congress to recognize a pressing national need and powerful opportunity and act now to create a 21st century air transportation system.

The House Science Committee plans two hearings and legislation on these aeronautic R&D issues over the next couple of months. Now I've got three questions pertaining to that. Given the Aerospace Commission's findings, what is the explanation for cutting aeronautics funding? The second question, what is NASA going to do to implement the recommendations of the aerospace commission. And finally Mr. O'Keefe, how do you view NASA's role to aid the Federal Aviation Administration, the FAA and U.S. industry to develop the next generation modernized air traffic system and technology for quiet aircraft?

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir. Thank you very much for those questions. As it pertains to the commission's findings, you're absolutely right. Their view is that we need to look at a robust aeronautics capability. In fiscal year '04, $959 million is what has been proposed. For the out years thereafter, that has relationship to the last question you raised, which is we are currently working with Marion Blakey at the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of Transportation and the Defense Department to look at how we might look at, not only quiet aircraft technology, but also airspace management efforts, the security and safety kinds of issues on aeronautics and aviation.

And so we're trying to wrap all those together. And I safety predict that we'll be making adjustments to those out years before they are actually presented to you for consideration for an annual appropriation. So at this juncture, that's a baseline, if you will. It goes nowhere but adjusted after we complete these efforts with the FAA and the Department of Transportation. And again, I take the findings and recommendations of the Walker commission very seriously and ones that we want to now reconcile relative to programs and plans on airspace management, aviation security and safety and quiet aircraft technology to look at those in coordination with Defense, DOT, FAA particularly. And Marion Blakey and I are working together very closely to develop as part of the '05 budget submission on what that may take.

GINGREY: Thank you.

O'KEEFE: No. Thank you, Congressman.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Bonner?

BONNER: Thank you. (inaudible) here. Thank you, Mr. O'Keefe. There have been several questions today about our return on investment, whether space exploration, human space travel or other space exploration is really worth it. I support human space travel and space exploration for its own sake. I still feel an open mouth wonder at the idea of space exploration. And I quickly become 49 going on nine when I think of human space travel. But when I am forced to offer grown up reasons for supporting space exploration, they are what you offered a few minutes ago and what Dr. DeBakey offered. And that is we have developed technologies that have practical commercial applications, unintended but happy results from research for another purpose. Is that still a purpose, a part of NASA's mission?

O'KEEFE: Absolutely. Yes, sir. And let me give you another example of what's in this budget now for your consideration, is the human research initiative that I talked about in the opening statement is the better part of about $400 million worth of effort dedicated to trying to determine the challenges to human endurance in space flight.

Now two of the challenges that we confront on every expedition mission on International Space Station is a degeneration of muscle mass and bone loss. And it's an accelerated degeneration. It's one that is roughly on the order of 30 percent muscle mass loss over a span of four to six months on orbit, is what most astronauts experience on International Space Station for that duration, long duration space flight. And they lose up to 10 percent of bone mass loss. So it's a very accelerated degeneration effort. If we could figure out how to arrest that, its applications for the rest of us earthbound folks is rather dramatic.

BONNER: Right.

O'KEEFE: Because it would avoid challenges with osteoporosis, hip replacements, you name it. If we can figure out how to deal with this on a much more gradual basis on earth, we could apply those same principals--and is an imperative to do so--to arrest the rapid degeneration that occurs on most astronauts there. So that's just one example of the kinds of breakthroughs I think that will help long-term duration space flight necessary for any exploration objectives, but also has an immediate near-term benefit to the millions of us here who regrettably as a consequence of aging will encounter these kinds of challenges. And if we can find out solutions to that, they have help in application to us here.

BONNER: I have some questions specifically about commercial applications of NASA's technology and research. Mr. O'Keefe, about how much does NASA now get from licensing agreements for technologies that have been the result of a commercial application from NASA's research?

O'KEEFE: Oh, I don't know. Let me provide that for the record. I just flat don't know the answer to that.

BONNER: OK. In your '04 budget, NASA's proposed budget, there is a new program called Enterprise Engine. Could you describe what that program is, what its purpose is, how it works?

O'KEEFE: Yes. Let me search my mind here. The objective there is to look at new engine technologies that is being, I believe in this particular case, is being conducted at the Glen Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio. Part of the effort is looking at a range of different fuel cell capabilities and others. I'm sorry. Am I not responding to the question right?

BONNER: No. I don't think that's the purpose.

O'KEEFE: I apologize. Let me answer it for the record, then, because I don't know then.

BONNER: All right.

O'KEEFE: But is that wrong?

BONNER: I mean, I don't understand. I'm sincerely asking questions to get information.

O'KEEFE: Yes, sir.

BONNER: But actually what you just said is contrary to all the information I've gotten before about what Enterprise Engine is.

O'KEEFE: OK. You know, I freely confess that it is likely that I got it wrong. Let me provide it for the record and not wing it. I got a note that says it is a commercialization effort. That is about as illuminating as mud. You know? I mean, I don't know. But I don't know. And let me not wing it. I've got it wrong.

BONNER: Right.

O'KEEFE: And I will provide it for the record.

BONNER: OK. I probably ought to direct the rest of my questions to this fellow sitting right over here.

O'KEEFE: That's what he gets for sending notes up. So you can have that one back.

BONNER: The budget for '04 also terminates all...

O'KEEFE: I would be delighted to let him sit here and let me leave. Excuse me, Congressman. (inaudible).

BONNER: The budget also terminates all the funding for the commercial technology program. How will you do that instead?

O'KEEFE: Well now, it's not all of it. There is a--the aspects of the commercial technology transfer that can only be carried out by NASA are the things we're continuing. There's a couple of efforts on a national technology or tech transfer center and a few other things that are still retained there. We're also looking to utilize the capacity on the part of industry, universities, others to pick up that tech transfer because in a lot of ways, the last thing we are is really competent at figuring out what commercial applications could come from something.

Industry is good at that. Universities are good at that. And so part of our task ought to be to make that information available to figure out how they can then apply it, rather than us the government, public sector trying to anticipate how you can use something for a commercial application. We are singularly unqualified to do that kind of activity. So we're trying to look to industry and universities to partner with us to assume that role in a more dynamic way.

CHAIRMAN: Gentleman's time has expired. Thank you very much. Ms. Jackson Lee?

JACKSON LEE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me as well, Mr. Administrator, add certainly our community's appreciation to NASA in the aftermath and particularly the attention given to the families. And as I know, the attention still given to the families. I think whatever we do in this session of Congress that relates to NASA should be in tribute and respect to their enormous loss.

O'KEEFE: Yes, ma'am.

JACKSON LEE: And to the sacrifice that was made by those who lost their life. I might want to mention General Howell who is our administrator or our director at NASA Johnson. Particularly want to compliment him and his staff for what they continue to do. Plainly let me just ask a question barring the reflection of the budget. Does this administration have any immediate perspective or in the future plans to scrap the human space flight, human space shuttle?

O'KEEFE: No.

JACKSON LEE: I think it is important the rumors abound. And even though there is a projected budget, you're telling me that the president does not intend to eliminate the human space shuttle?

O'KEEFE: Absolutely not.

JACKSON LEE: With that in mind, let me focus on what I think is enormously important. I have noted that you have listened, and NASA has expanded the investigatory board, the accident board that is reviewing. But I believe expansion would require some additional consideration that would bring some enhanced diversity and sensitivity to those who have been astronauts. And in keeping with that spirit, I would suggest to you that it could be expanded. Dr. Bernard Harris is part of our community. And we are well aware of retired Marine General Bolden who you have great respect for. And I would like to converse with you on that point about how we can ensure that we are reaching out and bring a number of sensitivities to the table that I think might be important.

I want to pursue very briefly the question of the e-mail, but not so much. That's going to be part of the investigation. It saddens us, but we need to find out the facts. But what I do want to pursue is the question of the enormous amount--issues that I've raised--of privatization that have occurred over the years that we've come to acknowledge.

I expect to call all of the corporations that have now taken up responsibilities that we used to have as NASA staff, government staff, into my office and ask them about their training, how long their employees have been in place. And I would ask the chairman to consider that as a hearing, to have the questions asked about the engineers, how long they've been in place, what do they know, and what do they not know. What is your assessment of the impact of privatization and the tenure of staff on the safety questions that we're now dealing with in the tragedy that we're now dealing with? And let me just follow-up so that you can have the time to answer to be able to ask the question dealing with crew survivability.

I think we have been lacking in that kind of research. And I'd like to know what we can do to provide funding focused specifically on crew survivability. I think we have been lacking in the 17 years since Challenger. And now, of course, we face another challenge with respect to this particular tragedy that we faced over the last month. And I'd appreciate your answers.

O'KEEFE: Indeed. Thank you very much. On the privatization consequences or the fact that it is the activities for launch as well as on orbit operational activities are conducted by contractors or individuals who are not United States government employees, the data would suggest over the course of the last decade that in the course of that time in which that transition's occurred that the incident of pre-launch anomalies as well as on orbit deficiencies or problems or whatever else have actually gone down. So the safety margins or capabilities have actually appeared to have improved during the course of that time based on the data. And again, we'll provide that for you in greater detail. But it is a--it just seems to be a pattern here that would suggest an improvement in those safety considerations in the course of that time.

Nonetheless, something went wrong on this flight. Whether it's attributable to the safety factors or not is something we will learn from the Gehman board's findings. And if it is, that's what we're going to correct. But all the information would seem to suggest this is not as a consequence of transition one way or the other.

Second point that I think is important in this area, too, is a difference of what appears to be--again, given my limited tenure of just a year and a month, is restricted to examination of the prior efforts--appears to be a transition from a quality control approach to a quality assurance approach. That is a modern, very contemporary transition that's occurred in lots of different things we do as human beings over the course of this last decade in lots of different enterprises and professional activities, which is to get away from the checkers checking the checkers to one in which we improve the process to assure that systemically there is a reduction of risk. And that's a more modern, contemporary management approach that seems to have paid dividends in this particular case.

But again, we will be guided by the independent Columbia accident investigation board's findings as to whether this may have been a contributing cause or not.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlelady's time has expired.

Ms. Johnson?

JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is the first time I've been invisible in a long, long time, to be here all this time and everybody that came in after me get called on first. So I want to make sure the record reflects that I don't like it.

CHAIRMAN: Make sure the record also reflects that the majority gets the list from the minority. And we follow the list to the letter. There is no favoritism played in this committee. We try to be fair to all concerned. The gentlelady may proceed for five minutes.

JOHNSON: This has nothing to do with party. Yes. Thank you. This has nothing to do with the party. It has to do with whether or not staff is sufficient. I'd like to ask unanimous consent to file my statement for the opening and apologize for having another committee where I had to do the same thing before coming. But I did get here around 11 o'clock.

Mr. O'Keefe, I appreciate you staying all this time and not losing your cool and all that. And I have observed--because this was obviously very disturbing to someone whose family called me before it came on CNN to tell me about a boom down in Dallas. But there are a number of things that I have some concerns about. First, the obsolete equipment and parts and with this shuttle being in operation since 1981 and plan on being there until 2020. With the advances that technology and everything else has made in this complex system, it would seem to me that ought to give you some kind of indication. It might have would. And then the computers have not been upgraded since only once. And that was '88 and '89. Now maybe something about all this I don't understand, and I'd like some comments on it.

The space exploration program research obviously has been one of the most successful in our nation with all of the products and services of which we've gotten. And it's costly. Most research is costly. But I think that it's certainly returned on the investment. But I want an explanation as to why the average person reading this would be shocked that something this important and this risky for human survival would have technology of which the research has been responsible for producing. And you have some of the most antiquated technology that I have heard of recently. It seemed to me that the shuttle just started falling apart. And it might be because of the age of it. But I'd like you to comment on that.

O'KEEFE: Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much. I read some of the same articles as well. And I'm mystified because this characterizes an asset that I'm not familiar with. The shuttle orbiters go through an exhaustive effort every eight to 10 flights called an orbiter major modification program. And as a consequence, what's conducted in that is a virtual tear down of the entire asset every eight to 10 flights in which you bring it down to the bare air frame and then reassemble it to assure that all the systems are modernized and upgraded and that the capabilities for upgrades are incorporated into each of the orbiters as they go through this process.

So roughly every, you know, four years you're seeing every one of these. There's always one orbiter in that process. Discovery is currently in that process. And what it'll come out as is not a brand new, but as close to restored condition asset that we can make it. Columbia had gone through a $160