KYLE HERRING: Good afternoon, everybody, and welcome to the Johnson Space Center for today's briefing. Joining us today is Ron Dittemore once again, who is the Space Shuttle Program manager in Houston, to my left, and to his left is Bob Cabana, who is the director of Flight Crew Operations here at the Johnson Space Center.

Again, we'll hear from both gentlemen and then we'll throw it open for questions. And I just want to caution up front, please keep your questions brief. One question per reporter. We've got a limited amount of time, about 90 minutes for today's briefing, and I've got a lot of centers, as you can imagine, that are interested in asking questions. So with that, I'll turn it over to Ron.

RON DITTEMORE: I'm sure that you can imagine that for us the last 24 to 36 hours have been a blur. It's been a difficult time period for us, but our teams have reacted professionally with much courage, and we've begun the painful process of trying to piece together the events that occurred leading up to the loss of Columbia.

Today I will update you on our latest information relative to the engineering facts as we know them today and let you know a little bit about how we are organized and how we're going about retrieving data at different locations in Northeast Texas and here in Houston and different sites, field centers in Florida and in Alabama.

But before I go any further, I would like to take a moment and express my gratitude on behalf of myself and everyone at NASA to the families of the astronauts and all of those in our country and around the world affected by this tragedy our deepest appreciation for their overwhelming support and expressions of sympathy. It has made a lot of difference in our lives and the lives of our families and we appreciate it very much.

Secondly, the assistance and offers of assistance that we have received from other agencies has been a significant help to us. From law enforcement, emergency response personnel, and from the general public, the response has been overwhelming. And we appreciate it.

For those families and individuals in east Texas and Ft. Worth and Dallas and Lufkin and Nacogdoches, those that have gone out of their way to help us identify debris and report it to the proper officials, we thank you. And we again, ask that you be cautious.

Again, we state that the debris, no matter how small, could have toxic consequences. And so, we ask you to notify the proper personnel in a timely fashion.

For what you have done so far, we express our thanks. Gathering this information, gathering the debris, notifying to us the locations has been important for us in this first step of piecing together the puzzle. And we are beginning to make progress.

Let me talk a little bit about our organization. I believe a press release has come out identifying a Columbia accident investigation board. That board is on its way to Shreveport, Barksdale Air Force base, should be arriving there this afternoon. We have a mishap response--our mishap investigation team already on the scene with headquarters at Barksdale Air Force base. We have other teams in the local area, in Lufkin, in Ft. Worth and Dallas, spreading out to small communities in the general area. Working with law enforcement, state and local law enforcement, to help us identify and collect debris.

At headquarters, we have formed a contingency action team. Underneath that contingency action team is a local mishap response team that's led here at the Johnson Space Center by the shuttle program office. Reporting to the mishap response team are several important teams. The mishap investigation team, headquartered right now at Barksdale Air Force base, reports on the status of debris and human remain collection. The MIT, as we refer to it, is made up of several different agencies. This is a partnership, a collective group of individuals, now working together, comprised of NASA, FEMA, NTSB, FBI, state and local law enforcement and Department of Defense personnel. It's a large team, but it's a necessary team, in order for us to do our job properly.

This team reports to us twice a day. Once in the morning, once in the afternoon, on the status of their efforts and their progress.

In addition to the MIT, we have numerous engineering teams that are beginning the laborious work of poring through data, taking their time to understand the different pieces and elements of the data. And that's--we're making progress. And I'm pleased at the progress that they're making. It's going to take us some days and weeks ahead to put it all together and make sure we have it correct.

Both the engineering teams and the MIT report to the mishap response team. And the mishap response team reports to the headquarters contingency action team. All those teams are, again, supporting the Columbia accident investigation board.

So, that's how we're organized. As you can imagine, yesterday, all these different elements were coming together. And I'm proud of the men and women that, under difficult, difficult circumstances, were able to organize, communicate, relocate, plan their activities, to the point where today we're becoming very organized, very supportive of each other and working together very well.

Let me talk to you a little bit about an update in the technical arena. Caution you, first of all, that what I'm telling you today is, again, fluid. It builds on yesterday's briefing, gives a little more detail, but I'm confident that even what I tell you today will be fluid and will change from day to day for a while. It's just the nature of these types of investigations. It's the nature of trying to work through an engineering problem. First reports are notoriously unreliable. Second reports are better. Third reports, you start getting to the real details and then you have some confidence. And so, we're on this path of getting to the third and fourth reports to get some confidence.

So I'm going to be honest and open with you, and tell you exactly what we know. And hope you understand that from day to day, it will change.

But let me give you some time correlation with location on the entry yesterday from California to northeast Texas in a little more detail. At 7:53 a.m. Central Standard Time--and all times will be Central Standard Time--as we were over California, four left-hand elevon hydraulic return line temperature measurements dropped off off-scale, as we talked about yesterday. The left brake line, strut actuator and uplock actuator temperature measurements rose significantly, 20 to 30 degrees in five minutes.

This is significant in that these measurements were located in the wheel well, left wheel well. This was the first occurrence of a significant thermal event.

It's also important for us that we understand and have found out that the elevon temperature measurements that I talked about that had dropped offscale low, are routed adjacent to the wheel well area.

At 7:54, we were over eastern California and western Nevada. At this time, the mid fuselage left bine (ph) line temp, showed unusual temperature rise. The mid fuselage is not--if you were looking at the vehicle, wing on the left side, the left fuselage, if you looked at the left fuselage, the wing below it, I'm talking about the temperature on the side of the vehicle, the left-hand side of the vehicle, above the wing. Unusual temperature rise. The temperature rose 60 degrees over five minutes. Whereas, on the right-hand side of the vehicle, in the same location but opposite on the right-hand side showed a nominal 15-degree rise, 1-5, 15 degree rise, over five minutes.

Another interesting piece of information that even though the mid fuselage bine (ph) line temp showed a 60-degree rise over five minutes, just inside that wall--outside we saw a 60-degree rise in five minutes--just inside the wall, in the payload bay, our cryotanks, our cryogenic tanks were nominal. So, it didn't look like there was any increase in temperature within the payload bay, as far as we're able to discern today.

At 7:58 a.m., over New Mexico, the roll trim and the elevons started to increase, indicating that we had an increase in drag on the left side of the vehicle.

Does this mean something to us? We're not sure. It can be indicative of rough tile. It can be indicative for, perhaps, missing tile. We're not sure yet. We do know it's indicative that there was an increase in drag on the left side of the vehicle.

At this time, we also lost the left, main landing gear tire pressure and wheel temperature measurements. We're fairly confident that this loss of information was measurement-related and not loss of the tires themselves, because the measurements were staggered in their loss. If we would have lost a tire, they would have lost, physically we believe that we would have lost all the measurements at the same time. But that didn't occur. We lost some measurements in a stagger fashion. So, it indicates to us that it was instrumentation, rather than a physical loss of the tire.

At 7:59 a.m., we're over west Texas. Again, we see an increase in the roll trim, as indicated by elevon motion, indicating that the vehicle was reacting to an increased drag on the left-hand side. The flight control system was countering that drag by trying to command the vehicle to roll to the right-hand side.

So, we were seeing a drag, causing the vehicle to roll to the left. The flight control system was commanding surfaces to get the vehicle back to where it believed it should be, more to the roll to the right.

Soon after, we had loss of signal. We do believe that there are--there is additional information to us, another 32 seconds that we believe, if we go into our computer system on the ground, that we can pull out additional data, in the neighborhood of 32 seconds after the point yesterday where we lost signal, and that may give us additional information about what happened, subsequent to that time.

In addition to that, yesterday you informed me of a report from California about an observer seeing what was indicated to be debris shedding from the orbiter. We have talked to that observer and we have his written statement. We believe that is important to us, because we are trying to correlate what that observer experienced and saw with the time line that I just related to you. And during the coming hours, overnight and tomorrow, we're going to overlay his report with what the data shows to us. And hopefully, the two of them will help us piece together to a path that we think might lead us to the cause.

Again, very early in our analysis. And we're still poring over a lot of data. So, bear with us as we go through this effort and bear with us as we report to you, because it's going to be fluid and it's going to change. And it's certainly possible that we'll contradict ourselves from day to day. That's just the nature of what we have to go through right now.

You asked me yesterday whether we were concentrating on the tile only. We are not. There are other areas--we're looking at structure, we're looking at thermal indications, we're looking at flight control. And as we bury down into the data, we're getting more and more information that will help us decipher the problem and get the pieces of the puzzle together to help us find the cause. So, we're--we're gaining ground, not a lot. We're gaining ground. And in the coming days, we'll give you more information as we get it.

At this point, I'd like to turn some time over to Bob. And then, we'll respond to your questions.

BOB CABANA, DIR., FLIGHT CREW OPERATIONS, JSC: First off, I'd like to thank all of you on behalf of the families for the tremendous outpouring of support from across the country. It really means a lot to them. I would also like to ask the media to respect the privacy of the families during this difficult time. I know when the time comes and they're ready, they'll be more than willing to talk with all of you.

It's been a tremendously difficult last couple of days. Yesterday was probably the hardest day in my life, to have to sit down with the families of close friends and tell them that their husbands and wives and moms and dads aren't going to be coming home. And if you've never had to do that, I hope you never have to.

I'd also like to say that the support that was provided in Florida to the families was outstanding. I couldn't be more proud of our team down there, in what they did. It went very well from that point of view. And getting the families home here to Houston, where they could have a better support network, went well.

We are working very closely with the families. We in the astronaut office, it is our family. And we have assigned astronauts to each of the families, as their casualty assistance officers, to support them and provide what they need.

We're focused on a very difficult time right now, and Ron gave you a lot of details about what happened. But I'd also like to point out that we're still finding space. We have a crew in orbit right now. And we have a space station on orbit. And they also deserve our full attention, to ensure that they have a safe and productive mission.

Along those lines, I had a long talk with Sox (ph) and Don and Nikolai this morning, mostly with Sox (ph) and Don. And I want you to know, they're being kept fully informed about what's going on down here on the ground.

Mostly it was just sharing. I shared with them. They're grieving up there, also. And they feel a little isolated. We're keeping them fully informed. And I told Sox (ph) I wouldn't keep anything from him, anything I knew down here on the ground about what was going on, he would know on orbit. And I shared the technical details that Ron shared with you with the crew. And I've shared some other things I'll tell you about.

They want to get through this process. And it's harder for them being detached from it in space. But all I can tell you is they're in tremendous spirits. They're proud to be where they are. They're proud to be part of the space program and be contributing to the science that's going on on the International Space Station.

I shared stories with them about the crew. I talked about better memories, about on-orbit video conference I had with them and how happy they were to be there and how much it meant to them to be contributing on this mission. And those are the memories I'm always going to cherish.

I'm sure you've heard, before I go on, just from another point of view, as far as supporting the crew on orbit, they were very glad to hear about the successful Progress launch and are looking forward to docking of the next Progress vehicle, about 08:50 Central time on Tuesday morning. They're well-prepared for it and looking forward to getting those supplies up there.

I'm also sure that you've all heard reports of the recovery of human remains in the debris field. I want you to know that the federal authorities, the local authorities are doing an extremely professional job in the field. That we have astronauts in the field with them. And that we're treating those remains with the ultimate respect and care that they deserve.

And out of respect for the families, I'm not going to go into anymore detail than that. I just want you to know that we're honoring our fellow crewmates and we're taking care of them. And it's a tough time. But I want you to know that we're going to get through this. We're a close-knit group. We're a family. And we support one another. And this is going to pass. We're going to continue to fly. And we are flying, and we're going to continue to do great things. Thank you.

KYLE HERRING, NASA PUBLIC AFFAIRS: Thank you, Bob. Let's see, to give you a rundown. We're going to start here in Houston. And we're going to go to the Kennedy Space Center for questions, followed by headquarters in Washington, followed by the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and then, to Lufkin, Texas, where a command center is located. So those are the sites for questions. As you can see, we have a lot of places to go. I would caution you and urge you to please ask one question. Please don't ask a follow-up. We don't have enough time for that. And if you have already heard the question from someone else, don't ask it again. You're just going to take time away from everybody else.

For here in Houston, please wait for a microphone. We have some mike handlers here. State your name and affiliation. And we'll start--we'll start right here, Greg, on the front row. A couple.

QUESTION: Gene Gleason (ph) from Channel 7 in Los Angeles. What--I know you're looking at flight controls and other things, but is there anything in the activity of the shuttle orbiter that would be consistent with the types of maneuvers you're seeing and the response from the elevon and the heating that would be other than missing tiles?

DITTEMORE: What's a little intriguing is that it looks like the orbiter is doing just what it should do. It's responding to command. It's maintaining its attitude. A little bit of a drag increase and a reaction from flight control is not alarming in any sense. When you piece it together with all the other events that we've talked about, we believe that might be a piece of the puzzle.

But even the trim that I talked to you about and the fact that the flight control system was asking for a little bit more trim to counter what looks like an increased drag on the left-hand side, it's well within the ability of the flight control system to respond to and to react. It's out of family, in the sense that we've never seen it to this degree. But it does not approach the limits of saturating the flight control system.

So, it's an interesting piece of data that's part of our equation. And we're putting it in with everything else we have got to look at. And I think it will help us in the long run. But by itself, it was not tremendously unusual.

QUESTION: If I can follow up...

DITTEMORE: No, no, you can't. Bill.

QUESTION: Sorry. It's Bill Horwood (ph), with CBS. Ron, you carefully led us into the landing gear wheel well, with some of these temp sensors and tying the hydraulic system to what you were seeing in other places. Realizing speculation is obviously what you are trying to avoid, but just getting me in the wheel well makes me wonder, if the temperatures that you saw and the drag you saw, would that in any way be consistent with either a landing gear door coming off or an ET (ph) umbilical attached door opening? And have you ruled out any connection with the impact--the debris impact from shortly after launch with the insulation?

DITTEMORE: Well, we certainly know that the wheel well area is one of our sensitive areas, thermally. We've analyzed that area intensively in the past. And the loss of any one single tile we believe would not be the cause for loss of a vehicle. In fact, we believe we can lose a tile in different locations, and all by themselves, we don't believe that would represent loss of vehicle. It may represent some structural damage, but not loss of a vehicle.

Certainly, as we start talking more about the wheel well area, what's interesting to us about it is yesterday, we had indications of the trailing edge, left in-board, left out-board elevon. As we are starting to look at the trail of this wiring, as it goes through the fuselage and out to the elevon, it has a common point as it goes adjacent to the wheel well. That's interesting to us. That's all we know today.

So, as we go through the coming days, maybe I'll get more information to add to this puzzle. I don't have anymore than what I told you today. I don't want to speculate anymore than the information I gave you. Be cautious. I know I'm thinking the same thing you're thinking, but I can't go beyond that. And I want to be careful that I don't jump to conclusions, because if I do, I'll miss something else that may be very important.

So, you got the point. There may be some significance to the wheel well. We're going to look in that area more carefully. We're going to inspect vehicles down in Florida. OB-103 (ph) is going through its maintenance down period. We may elect to go into the wing and look how this wiring has been implemented in the fuselage to help us understand what 102 (ph) looked like, to see if there was any thermal breaches, would that also affect the wheel well and the wiring. So we've got some more detective work, but that's why I say we're making progress, inch by inch.

QUESTION: Eric Roanoke (ph), ``L.A. Times.'' Did this spacecraft carry a flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, and if so, were they armored you with standard sort of forces?

DITTEMORE: Well, we carry a voice recorder, we carry data recorders. But they're not armored in the way that you think about commercial aircraft and a black box. We don't have that capability. It's doubtful that those avionics boxes survived.

QUESTION: Evan Daly (ph), News 24, Houston. Regarding the International Space Station, there was some initial concern by the public about getting supplies to the station. Can you talk a little bit more in detail about what's going to be happening on Tuesday, how you're getting the supplies there? What's being taken there and also how this accident is going to affect future deliveries?

CABANA: I leave that to the space station program to discuss in greater detail, but it was the planned Progress launch, bringing up the nominal supplies. The program is making every effort to ensure that the crew on orbit has all that they need to continually man the space station. And right now, there's absolutely no concern for any of their consumables on board.

QUESTION: Jennie Blankenship (ph), with KI CBS News in Austin. Many of us attended church services this morning for the astronauts. And I think a lot of people tend to think of them as scientists, or science-oriented people. But can any of you tell me how big a role God or spirituality plays in astronauts' lives? I understand it's very strong.

CABANA: Well, I'll tell you right now. I wish I had half the faith of Rick and Evelyn Husband. I don't know of any finer individual or anybody that has a greater faith in his Creator. And it's been a source of strength for Evelyn. I know that she's content to know that Rick is with his Lord, now, and that brings a lot of peace to her. Rick was a tremendous guy.

QUESTION: Samantha Levine (ph), ``U.S. News and World Report.'' Do you have any information on the size and/or weight on any pieces of material that may have broken from the shuttle on its ascent?

DITTEMORE: Are you talking about the ascent?

QUESTION: Yes.

DITTEMORE: We didn't have any pieces that broke away from the shuttle, the orbiter, during the launch phase. The only thing that we know of and that we're looking into is what I previously briefed, and that was the piece of foam installation that was shed by the external tank.

QUESTION: Sanjay But (ph), ``Palm Beach Post.'' You talked a little bit about the drag on the left wing and how the craft has measures it can take. Could you elaborate a little bit on whether there are any kind of optional maneuvers that the crew had to ease off of that left wing in their entry?

DITTEMORE: At this time, during re-entry, the crew is watching the flight control system do its job automatically. And they would not be alarmed. They may watch the trim. They'll have indications in the cockpit of the flight control system, trying to trim out the vehicle. And they would certainly know that the vehicle was trying to, maybe yaw (ph) and roll a little bit to the left. And the flight control surfaces would respond appropriately. And just like on an airplane, they would correct it and move the orbiter and straighten the nose out and get it to the right altitude. Very small motions, very small degrees.

And the crew would watch it. I'm sure they would talk about it, but there would be really no cause for alarm. The vehicle was doing what it was designed to do, and the software and the flight control systems were handling any disturbance.

QUESTION: Gentlemen, Chuck Goudy (ph) from ABC 7 in Chicago. You touched on this a little bit in that answer, but is there any evidence that the crew knew that there was a problem during the six-minute timeline that you were just talking about? And is there evidence that they, indeed, did what you just said they could do?

DITTEMORE: Well, based on our familiarity with the crew and the training regimen, we know that's what they were doing during re-entry. We know they're monitoring flight control systems. We know that they're monitoring attitude. We train them to do that. As pilots, that is what they're going to do. So we're confident that's exactly what they were doing.

We have no data, no communication, no evidence that the crew was alarmed, had any communication. We had no communication with the ground concerning these parameters that I've talked to you about. I feel certain that on board, they could have talked one to another, to say look at that particular parameter. We ought to watch it. But I'm speculating that's what happened. I feel confident as pilots that's what they would do. But we have no information from the crew to the ground that would confirm what they were doing on board.

QUESTION: Phil Robertson (ph), with WFTV in Orlando. Going back to the discussions concerning the debris hitting the tiles, were those engineering meetings--was the discussion intense? Was there a lot of discussion about that? Was anybody even throwing up a red flag or throwing out possible contingencies or scenarios that might need to take place, just in case there was some drag or anything else?

DITTEMORE: We handled that debris impact like we would do any off-nominal event. Number one, it occurred. Two, where did it hit the orbiter? Three, since it hit the orbiter, what could be any consequence of hitting the orbiter? Is it severe or inconsequential? And should we do anything about it?

We went through the gamut of what we normally do. The management was involved, technical people, technical experts were involved and they had a thorough discussion. Our technical experts believed the debris that hit the orbiter was inconsequential. It was not going to represent an impact to our flight control qualities or our safety.

But even then, we talked about what if it did. What would we do, even if it did. And we had that discussion. We talked about, in our technical teams, is there a way that if we were wrong, was there a way during entry that would minimize the thermal profile? And we reminded ourselves if you think about how we've designed this vehicle, with these tiles, we fly the minimal profile today. Anything beyond this profile aggravates the temperature extremes, and that seems logical. It is logical. Because I'm re-using this vehicle over and over again, so I'm trying to send it through an environment that minimizes the wear and tear on the structure and the tile.

And so, we're already at the minimum environment, as far as coming in during entry. We asked ourselves, is there any other option? There's no other option. If you want to come back home, you have got to come back through the atmosphere. And the way this vehicle flies, you have to get the nose up in the air and you have to protect yourself from the environment. And we put it in such an attitude as to minimize the thermal effects on the vehicle.

We were there already. There was nothing we can do from an environment or technique point of view. So we talked about that. We reinforced our beliefs. We reinforced our knowledge. We went through the ``what if'' scenario, if we were wrong, what's the worst case. All that was talked about. Again, we had strong participation from our safety and quality, strong participation from our flight crew members, our flight control, our mission ops. All the technical and engineering disciplines, the appropriate management, and we concluded that it did not represent a safety concern.

It represented a turnaround issue that we needed to go investigate. And we still believe that today. But as we gather more evidence, certainly more of the evidence may point us in a different direction, and we're very interested in that.

QUESTION: You mentioned an additional--Harry Forrestfield (ph) from CBS Television, you mentioned on additional 32 seconds of data that you think may be in your computers. Can you tell us anything about the nature of that data? Whether there's any question that it is in your computers? And how long it would take to extract and analyze?

DITTEMORE: It should take us no time at all to get that data. The reason it doesn't come forward right away is because we have criteria. When the data starts getting ruddy (ph) or doesn't represent itself in the framework of the packaging of the data down to the ground, if it's not--for example, if it's not 80 percent or 90 percent good, then we throw up flags and don't allow it to be displayed to our flight control system.

So, we're going after data that we know we can extract. It may have been flagged as bad information because it violated this criteria. But yet, we can go in and extract it. And let's say half the frames were good. Well, we're going to go after those--that 50 percent, maybe that information may lend something to our investigation. We've done it in the past. We did it during Challenger. And so, we're going to go after this information.

QUESTION: I'm Mark Corro (ph) from ``The Houston Chronicle.'' And I have a timeline question for Ron Dittemore. Can you explain this flap? The foam issue on a timeline basis? When your engineering analysis saw the film in flight day or mission elapsed time, when you began an internal discussion of this issue and when you resolved it? And can you put it on some sort of day scale or something that we can relate to, in terms of the launch and the landing?

DITTEMORE: I can certainly do that. I don't have all that information with me today. We will provide you with that information. Recall that this event happened around 80 seconds after launch. We didn't recognize that this event occurred until the following day, because it is our practice to review all the launch films in great detail, frame by frame. And when you have a very small debris, piece of debris or foam that sheds off the vehicle, it's not obvious that that occurs, especially as you look up into the plume, you're looking at a lot of rocket engine and solid rocket motor plume and you're not able to see a very piece of debris, unless you look at it very carefully, with the right experts on the film.

And we did--we do this by practice, the following day. And we report any occurrences of debris. This was done, just as we planned. It was reported on the following day, the day after launch. And at that point, we kicked off the engineering teams to look and see whether that represented a concern.

What I don't know today is was it one day or three days before that issue was resolved to our satisfaction. It was more than one. And I just don't know how long, and we'll take a note to get that information to you outside this briefing.

QUESTION: Kelly Young (ph), at ``Florida Today.'' For context, can you describe for me the reasons why you don't want to leave the station unmanned and the process for powering it down?

CABANA: Well, I think we don't want to leave it unmanned because we're exploring. We're doing science. We have a mission. We're up there to do what we set out to do. And that's not leave the space station. The crew is working very hard up there. They've got a lot to do. And it just wouldn't be right to quit.

DITTEMORE: And at this point, there's no reason to consider unmanning the station. We have sufficient supplies. We're able to communicate and perform and function as planned. We're early in our investigation on the shuttle. And so, it's premature for us to consider even talking about that. And it is our goal and our objective to stay continuously manned, unless there would be some other reason not to.

QUESTION: Mike Cabbage (ph) with ``The Orlando Sentinel,'' for Ron. Insulation and ice coming off the tank and striking the orbiter during ascent is certainly not anything new. Could you talk a bit about what the program has done in recent years to minimize the chance of damage coming from events like that? And is this the sort of a calculated risk or an inherent risk in the shuttle's design that's always going to be there?

DITTEMORE: Well, it's very important for us to understand the debris field and the possibility or potential of debris. Small pieces of debris may not be any problem for you at all. Depending on when that debris occurs. We have established criteria, even before liftoff, that we will not permit a launch if we have ice on the tank, or ice on the vehicle, in specific locations. And these locations have been analyzed in such a way that we know if we have so much ice at a various--at a predetermined thickness, we know that it could shed off the tank and could impact either the windows of the orbiter or the underside of the orbiter and affect the tile.

So, we're very cautious about debris, and anything that might represent a debris source. Ice would be one of those.

We have had instances in the past where we have shed debris. I talked to you yesterday about an insulation problem on the tank, a year or two ago, where during the launch phase, we were reaching an environmental condition where the insulation was outgassing (ph) in such a way that it was popping pieces of insulation off the tank and it was impacting the bottom of the orbiter and it was damaging the tile. And the tile damage was somewhat superficial, but because the popcorning--popcorning was numerous, it represented a significant increase in the number of tiles that were being damaged, and hence when we got back to turn the vehicle around, we had a lot more work to do to repair tiles and to replace them.

So we were aggressive in trying to understand this popcorning, to the point of putting cameras on the boosters and looking at the tank so that we can actually see the phenomenon occur. And then, we were better able to resolve it, and which we did resolve it. We determined the root cause and we implemented corrective action, and we do not have the popcorning phenomenon occur any longer.

It wasn't too long ago that we flew a camera on the top of the tank. And you saw that. We flew it once. Our purpose in flying the camera was to get a bird's eye view of looking down at the tank and the orbiter interface, to learn if there was anything that was going on that, perhaps, that we hadn't predicted and couldn't see from the ground. And we built these cameras and positioned them in such a way, for just that type of engineering evaluation.

Now, we flew it once. And we were surprised a little bit by the hazing that we got at SRB separation. And so, we're working on that particular camera. But that's the type of activity we would put in place. And those are the types of preventative actions we're working on to make sure that we mitigate any possibility of debris.

QUESTION: Lisa Stark (ph) with ABC News. When you realized that you had this debris that had struck the shuttle and you started your analysis, what was the discussion about trying to take a look either through satellites or these large telescopes that the military has? And why was a decision made not to try that?

DITTEMORE: We certainly had that discussion, because we know there is a capability available to us to take a look at the orbiter and, perhaps, get us some pictures that are quite a bit--a close-up view. I talked about this yesterday, where we had a drag chute door fall off. Did you listen so I don't have to go through that one again?

We had the drag chute door fall off right there at the launch phase, and when we got to orbit, we were very interested in what the back end of the vehicle looked like. And we actually did take some pictures. We positioned the orbiter at a particular attitude and we took some pictures. We reviewed the pictures, and they did not reveal a lot of granularity that would help us. We knew that as our background. That was our database. We believed that taking a picture at the bottom of the orbiter, looking for a tile or tile damage, might show us--you know, the bottom of the vehicle is black--it might show us white. By itself, a white tile is not an alarming fact. It does not show us the depth of tile that may have been shaved off. We cannot make a determination conclusively, whether that represents a concern or not.

The second factor was, even if I had information, I can't do anything about it. I'm really helpless to go out and do any tile repair. And the third factor was I had done the analysis. The best experts at our disposal concluded that it was a minor problem, not a significant problem. And when you added all that up, there was no need to take pictures to document any evidence, because we believed it to be superficial and it to be a turnaround issue and not a safety issue. And so, we didn't take any pictures.

QUESTION: Paul Dandridge (ph) with Channel 2 and Channel 9 in Los Angeles. Having moved away from the debris bin that hit the orbiter, saying it was inconsequential, can we move to the wheel well and that breach. What might possibly, if in fact that was the case, have caused that?

DITTEMORE: I didn't say we had a wheel well breach. All I said is we had some temperature sensor and pressure sensor indications that we lost. Off-scale low, which means they quit working. We did have an indication that on the side of the vehicle--not in the wheel well--on the side of the vehicle, we had a 60-degree rise over five minutes. That's not normal.

I really have no temperature rise inside of the main gear well, at all. All I know is that I lost temperature measurements. All I know is I have routing of wire close by. I know that the left side of the vehicle was getting warmer than the right side. And it would be speculation to say that the main landing gear well is my problem. I don't know that yet. I'm giving you that information--I'm giving you as much information as I have. And that's all I know today.

I have no breach. I have no indicator that says the wheel well got hot. All I am doing is putting together different pieces of the puzzle and trying to understand what it means. And I don't yet have the answer.

QUESTION: Chris Hainbulb (ph) with WFAA TV in Dallas. Texas Governor Rick Perry has reportedly told school administrators in 93 counties not to open the schools until all of them have been fully inspected for debris and guaranteed safe. Did this advice come from NASA? And just how much of a threat does this pose to children?

DITTEMORE: I'm not aware of that report, nor am I aware of any advice that's coming from NASA, relative to the debris, to the governor. But I am--let me reinforce the fact that pieces of debris can be toxic. And for the safety of the public, the safety of families and children, it is best that you not pick up the debris. It's best that you identify it, locate it and then call the proper authorities. Something that looks innocent could have become contaminated just because of the event. And we certainly don't want anybody to get harmed because of their zealousness to help us.

And so, we're trying to get the word out, to be careful. Call the proper authorities. Don't pick it up. Let the proper authorities move it and tag it appropriately.

HERRING: OK, I'm going to take two more questions here before going to the other center, so we'll take Miles and then...

MILES O'BRIEN, CNN SPACE CORRESPONDENT: Question for Ron from Miles O'Brien at CNN. Ron, what do we know about the specific external tank? Was it a lightweight tank? In other words, a tank that hasn't been used as much of late, because super lightweight tanks have been used for the space station--and so, how much shelf life did it have? And have you had a chance to look at all about--and document any of the processes for putting on the foam of this particular tank?

DITTEMORE: We have really two types of tank in our inventory. We have what we call a lightweight tank and a super lightweight tank. The super lightweight tank was developed in our efforts to improve our performance, to gain more cargo lift capability to the station. The lightweight tank is what we flew, consistently, many years ago. And the one that we flew on SDS-107 was one of two that we had in our inventory remaining.

There's no concern about the lightweight tank. It's just different material than the super lightweight. It weighs roughly 6,000 to 7,000 more pounds than the super lightweight tank. But structurally and performance-wise, we had used it for many years and had no reason to doubt its capability.

I don't know, Miles, how long that particular tank had been built, sitting in inventory. We can certainly get that. We have that knowledge. And we have one more tank that's sitting in inventory, of lightweight nature.

QUESTION: Bruce Nichols (ph), ``Dallas Morning News,'' for Ron Dittemore. You told us yesterday that the crew routinely got out of their seats to take pictures as the tank separated. Did they tell you what they saw? Were they able to transmit those pictures? Did they know it could be serious? What did they tell you?

DITTEMORE: We did alert the crew later on that we did have a debris impact from the tank onto the orbiter. We kept them informed of our analysis on the ground. And finally, as we have concluded that it was not going to be anything more than superficial, we alerted the crew to that fact.

I don't recall if we had any conversations from the crew to the ground, relative to the pictures that they took. Bob, do you recall?

CABANA: I don't--I don't think there were any. Normally, the crew would take the pictures and stow that film, mark it and stow it for early return to Houston upon landing.

DITTEMORE: Especially given the knowledge that it was superficial and inconsequential, they went on with their business, stored the film and knew that we were interested in it as soon as they landed.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE)

RON DITTEMORE, NASA SHUTTLE PROGRAM DIRECTOR: No. This is film. Not digital.

KYLE HERRING, NASA PUBLIC AFFAIRS: OK. Let's go to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida now for questions, please.

QUESTION: Marcia Dunn with the Associated Press for Ron.

What's your best estimate on the size of the debris that came off the tank during liftoff? Are you 100 percent it was foam and not ice or some other matter? And any idea on the size of the damaged area where it impacted?

DITTEMORE: I'm sure we have the relative size, to the best of our ability to judge, for the debris that shed the tank, and we can get that information for you, if you would talk to our public affairs representatives.

The impact damage to the vehicle was not determined. We believe that at the velocity that it was shed from the tank and at the incident angle that it hit the bottom of the orbiter that it did not represent any significance to us from a safety point of view.

And we don't believe that there was, from our review of the film, any hardware that came off the tank. We believe it was all the foam insulation.

QUESTION: Pat Duggins from NPR and WMFE.

Considering the wreckage and the condition of the wreckage on the ground, how useful is that going to be for your investigation, or are most answers going to come from telemetry?

DITTEMORE: We're hopeful that there are some clues remaining to be found through investigation of the evidence that we gather on the ground. We're hopeful that there are pieces of hardware that we can look at that will help us solve this puzzle.

And, as in any reconstruction of a catastrophic event, it's going to take some time. We're pulling together the experts in the country that do these types of things, and we are very hopeful that we will find the necessary information that will help us solve why ``Columbia'' was destroyed.

QUESTION: This is Chris Kridler from ``Florida Today.''

I realize that the STS-107 astronauts could not have spacewalked underneath the orbiter, but didn't NASA have a procedure that was tested in the late '70s that might have allowed an astronaut to go outside and repair the tiles? Can you discuss that?

DITTEMORE: Early in the program, we recognized that if we lost tile or multiple tile that we didn't have any repair technique, and we tried to develop such a technique. We finally abandoned pursuing that option. We just didn't believe it was feasible at the time.

We were also very concerned that--as you send a spacewalk crewmember over the side of the vehicle and go underneath the vehicle, we are concerned that just the nature of them trying to position themselves in space underneath the vehicle could cause more damage than what we were trying to fix.

And so the risk was greater to send a crew over the side to try to do something that was very hard to do than it was to try to fix whatever problem that we thought was not a significant risk. So we made those trades and, finally, abandoned the idea of trying to have some tile-repair kit or tile-repair capability.

QUESTION: Tom Donovan, WPBF, West Palm Beach for Ron Dittemore.

In the history of the shuttle program, have you ever gotten reentry data either from the orbiter or on the ground that shows any other orbiter came close to or began to have attitude problems similar to the ones for the ``Columbia'' that you described earlier?

DITTEMORE: I wouldn't classify what I described as an attitude problem. I would say that the description I gave you was the flight control system reacting to a drag condition, and we have had conditions in the past where the vehicle sensed an atmospheric layer, difference--difference in density altitude, and the flight control system would react to it as it came in through the atmosphere, and so those types of things are normal.

What's a little bit unusual about this one is that, even though it was within the capability of the flight control system to respond to this increased drag, the degree of which the elevons were trying to correct is outside our family of experience.

So, if you've flown 112 or 113 flights and this is the first one where the degree of elevon up motion to respond to the drag is outside of your previous database, that's unusual. And that would always trigger a response from our engineering teams to look at that carefully.

QUESTION: Ron, this is Stefan Coledan with ``The New York Times'' and ``Popular Mechanics.''

During the mission, were there any concerns or requests by the astronauts' families to take a better look for any damage caused by the debris during the launch after that was published?

DITTEMORE: I'm not aware of any request outside the normal engineering teams and normal program management. It would be very unusual for the families to even be involved in such an event.

The families in our community and in the astronaut corps have a basic trust in the program, in our management, in our engineering expertise, just as we who manage the program have a great trust in the astronauts that fly and operate the machine. There's a tremendous respect on both sides. And the families would have great confidence and do have great confidence in our ability to do the right thing.

As we come into these types of situations, as I accept this position as the manager of the space shuttle program, it's my personal commitment to make the decisions that will provide safety to the crew members. It's my personal commitment to never launch or take risks or perform any activity that I believe where--it is unacceptable risk to the crew member.

My goal and my objective is to always bring back the astronaut to their family. It's the highest priority I have. That's the trust that they have in me. And I have the trust in them that they will have confidence in our ability.

CABANA: Stepping into that rocket, going, flying into space, we all know what risk we accept. That's an easy risk to accept. The difficult risk to accept is strapping your friends into that rocket and launching them into space. And, believe me, that's--none of the decisions that are made are taken lightly. They're taken with the gravest concern.

QUESTION: This is Peter Wallsten with ``The Miami Herald.''

Do you have any indications yet about the state of the crew compartment over the course of that five-to seven-minute period?

DITTEMORE: I have no information on the state of the crew compartment. All I know is, to the point that we lost communication with the vehicle, there was not a problem that was indicated on data--on the data or in the voice communication from the crew.

QUESTION: Ron, this is Jim Banke, space.com.

Could you elaborate more on the sensors that are in the wing? For example, when the sensors are failing off, especially temperature sensors, and they just suddenly go to zero, there's no indication, even in a microsecond of data, that there was any temperature rise before those sensors failed, or is it simply an on/off kind of thing?

DITTEMORE: It's an/off type of thing. With instrumentation, when you--when you get--if you cut the wire, the actual indication doesn't slowly degrade. It's either on or off, and that's exactly what happens here.

And so, when you hear us say off-scale low or off-scale high, instrumentation will react that way when it just loses its capability to perform. And so, in this case, it was as if someone had cut the wire. It was immediately gone and did not give us any indication of an upward or descending trend.

But I did give you some information from other areas that do indicate that there was an elevated heating environment on the left side of the vehicle.

QUESTION: Ron, this is Craig Covalt with ``Aviation Week.''

Given the design of the landing gear doors, is it possible to have a door slightly ajar or a seal slightly unsealed, if you will, and not have a telemetry or cockpit indication of that indication on a door?

DITTEMORE: I don't believe so. And, in fact, as we stow the landing gear on the ground, that's performed before we even mate to the external tank. There's significant testing that is performed to verify that the doors are seated properly, and we have mechanical rigging that is part of the design that does not allow the door to become unseated, and so I do not believe that to be a problem.

QUESTION: Joanna Romeloitis (ph), CBC Television.

You say with every briefing, you become more confident in the information you're putting forward. Do you have a better sense today how long this investigation will take and how long these shuttle missions here at Kennedy Space Center will be delayed?

DITTEMORE: Of course, I'm searching for that answer just as you are. We're less than 36 hours into this investigation, and so we really cannot be expected to then offer a schedule of when we'll be complete. We can just say that we're going about our business methodically, professionally, with a lot of intensity, and we will brief you on a regular basis and keep you up to speed on what is occurring.

QUESTION: Ron, Keith Landry, Fox 35 News in Orlando.

Given that we've been talking a lot about the tile system and how there have been issues with that for many years, is NASA working on any long-term research to phase out the tile system? Any new technology, say, like a stealth-flight technology that might be better?

DITTEMORE: I wouldn't characterize that we have had tile issues for many years. In fact, we've flown this vehicle for over 20 years, and our tile system of insulation has performed wonderfully. True, we have some repair that we have to do from time to time. But it's a unique design. It's lightweight, and it performs its job extremely well in rejecting the heat.

What we have invested over the years is time and energy and money in trying to develop a stronger tile, where a tile has a stronger surface so that, when it is hit by debris, it doesn't penetrate the black surface of the tile.

We have been successful at doing that in some applications, and you can look at the back of the orbiter today and see some of the improvements in tile over the timeframe that we're talking about.

An older tile would be damaged during the launch phase, and every flight, as it comes back, we would have to repair or replace the tile. The newer tiles on the back end of the vehicle look shiny new, don't require any tender-loving care.

And so we have made advances in tile.

But the application of tile is different. You can't use the same type of tile in every location. It has to be designed for the underside of the vehicle because of its environment. The backside of the vehicle has a different tile design, a different density, a different weight. And so we have difficulty formulating a new tile with the right level of increased toughness or hardness and having it applied to the bottom of the vehicle.

We are continuing to investigate whether we can develop a stronger, tougher tile. We're spending money this year to do so. We've been spending money for many years to try to develop this technology. We haven't been successful yet to make an improvement over the existing tile, but we're making progress.

QUESTION: You said earlier that you get twice daily reports from the mishap response team, and I'm wondering if they reported to you how much debris has been recovered and if you could express that in either pounds or perhaps a percentage of the total vehicle that has been recovered.

DITTEMORE: We have not yet received that type of information from the team. Over the last 24 hours, the team has relocated to the--to Shreveport. The major part of their focus was to get organized, to send teams out, to identify the debris, catalog it, make sure it had the right environmental protection, and start to move the debris to a staging area.

Over the coming days and week, we will get more information as to how much debris we have found, how large the pieces are, and we will begin to do that painstakingly laborious task of trying to catalog and piece these things together, and we have the good fortune of having experts from NTSB at our disposal who are used to doing these types of things in their line of work as they investigate airplane crashes, and they are helping us immensely in the same type of tasks.

But, up to this time, I don't have any information relative to size and numbers of debris.

QUESTION: Ron, this Todd Jurkowski with WKMG Local 6 in Orlando.

You talked earlier about how your team got together and tried to decipher what danger, if anything, from the debris that hit in the damage to the tiles. Can you elaborate a little bit more about what role the crew played on board the shuttle?

Was it possible that they could have possibly done spacewalks, and, looking forward, maybe will there be some provisions made that the crew will actually be able to do on-board inspections of the possible damage in future missions to try to avoid any second-guessing or questions about how bad the damage actually is?

DITTEMORE: See, I mentioned this to most folks yesterday, but we have no capability to inspect the bottom of the vehicle. We have no capability to repair tile damage on the bottom of the vehicle.

Even on this particular mission, we did not even have the remote manipulator system, or RMS, to look over the side underneath the bottom of the vehicle. And even if we did, its angle that--its capability to look at the tile and discern damage is very, very limited.

So our ability to look at bottom of the vehicle is extremely limited, and we have no capability to repair. That's all I can say about that.

QUESTION: Dan Bilow (ph) with West TV (ph).

Ron, can you say how many seconds into the ascent was that minor debris impact, and is the progress that you are making today in this investigation in any way leading you away from that impact as a possible cause for what happened?

DITTEMORE: That impact occurred approximately 80 seconds after liftoff, and it's not clear to me yet that we have evidence that points to the fact that the debris was the root cause. I can't say that today.

We are gaining some confidence that it was a thermal problem, rather than some other nature, rather than a structural indicator. But it, again, is too early for me to speculate on what all that means.

And so I'd just request your indulgence as we continue to gather information. Just the difference between yesterday at this time and today has been significant, and I believe another 24 hours will be even more helpful.

So, as I continue to meet with you, I will give you the best information I have available to me and keep you informed, but I don't have any smoking gun. I don't have anything that I can tell you is the root cause.

Certainly, you've heard us talk and you can make your own judgments and speculate, but I'd caution you about that speculation.

We do have teams that are heavily concentrating on the orbiter wing, we have other teams that are looking very carefully at the external tank foam insulation, just as we have engineering teams looking at all of the other sub-systems.

We believe some subsystems will be ruled out as a cause fairly soon. Others will stay in our base that we're looking at for a longer time, and I'll keep you informed of which ones are the major subsystems that continue to be in our job jar as being more interesting to us from a root cause point of view than others.

QUESTION: Phil Long, ``Miami Herald.''

Ron, where is the debris being taken now for staging and where do you anticipate that it will be taken ultimately for analysis?

DITTEMORE: Our staging area will be the Barksdale Air Force Base in Shreveport, and its ultimate location--we haven't made a decision yet. We just know this first staging point will be our primary contact for this debris.

QUESTION: Elliott Kleinberg (ph), ``Palm Beach Post.''

Money issues aside, is there anything out there that you've been researching that might eventually make a better material than the tiles themselves, taking into consideration weight and the cost of the material?

DITTEMORE: Well, we are continually searching to see if there are--there exists the right development of technology such that it has an application for this vehicle. We'll continue to search and investigate resources, whether it be the tile or other subsystems such that it can improve the safety and reliability of this vehicle.

I think that we have mentioned to you that it is our intent to fly this vehicle system for many years into the future, and so we are investing in the right technologies and searching for other technologies that would be of benefit to us. So the tile system is one, and there are others that are equally if not more important. So this is just one area of many that we are investigating.

HERRING: OK. That's--excuse me. That's all the questions at the Kennedy Space Center. Let's move to NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C., please.

QUESTION: Sumana Chatterjee with Knight Ridder Newspapers.

About the post-launch review process, which engineering and technical teams and divisions were involved and was their conclusion unanimous that the debris impact did not pose a safety hazard, or was there dissension?

DITTEMORE: Let's see. Let me make sure I understand. You're talking about the external tank debris during ascent?

QUESTION: Yes.

DITTEMORE: The predominant team will be the engineering teams related to the orbiter vehicle itself, and the types of disciplines are structures and mechanics, integration teams that understand the environment and the transport mechanisms between the external tank and the wing of the orbiter. You have thermal experts, tile experts, and it goes on and on. We also engage the external tank technical experts and the management of all the above.

Whenever we do a analysis of this type, not only do we engage the technical experts of all the disciplines and their management, but we also engage the operational and functional areas, the astronaut corps, our operations flight control arenas, our safety and quality and mission assurance experts.

And all these people were engaged, all of them heard the story, all of them reviewed it to their satisfaction, and the consensus--unanimous consensus was that it was, as I represented to you earlier, it was not a significant event.

QUESTION: This is Frank Mourning (ph) with ``Aviation Week.''

Ron, you mentioned earlier that the temperatures in the cryo-tanks were nominal. Have you completely ruled out the cargo bay and the space head modules as any source of thermal problems?

DITTEMORE: We haven't ruled out anything up to this point. I share that information with you because that's the information that I have to look at myself. It does indicate that one data point shows that, on the inside of the payload bay, there does not appear to be an increasing thermal environment, whereas, on the left side of the vehicle, it was increasing.

We're still gathering more information, but, with that one piece of information, which is all we have today, it seems to indicate that the payload bay is not the area of focus. Have we ruled that out? No, we haven't. I'm sharing with you that information to help you go along with us as we try to decipher the evidence and try to put the pieces of the puzzle together.

We haven't ruled out anything. We're still looking. It's just information that both you and I and our teams need to understand more fully in the future.

QUESTION: Andrew Lawler from ``Science'' magazine.

Were there any other research missions planned for ``Columbia,'' and had there been current discussions about mothballing ``Columbia''?

DITTEMORE: At this--at this point, I believe it's academic to talk about ``Columbia.''

CABANA: Do we have any other questions at headquarters?

QUESTION: Were there discussions in the past, though, about it recently, and were there research missions planned?

DITTEMORE: There were missions, if I understood your question right, and perhaps I didn't--there were missions that were planned on ``Columbia'' in the future, that is correct, if that's the question you're asking me.

We had two missions in the future, one mission slated to go to the International Space Station in the latter part of this year and another mission to service the Hubble Space Telescope in November of 2004.

And, because of the loss of this vehicle, that will impact the planning of those particular missions, and we'll have to go back and understand just what the options are going to be, and I'm sorry if I misunderstood your question.

HERRING: OK. That's all at headquarters. Let's go to the Marshall Space Flight Center for questions now, please.

QUESTION: This is Shelby Spires with ``The Huntsville Times.''

Ron, can you elaborate on the support you're getting in terms of engineering and document support from United Space Alliance and other contractors for the shuttle? Are they participating in this investigation, and are you satisfied with that participation to date?

DITTEMORE: We're getting help from all of our prime contractors, we're getting help from all of our field centers, all their technical experts, both on the public and private sector, and we're not wanting for anything at this point.

We're very pleased with the outpouring of support from both public and private and academia, and we appreciate all offers for advice and help, and we are consulting with those that offered their help in--to determine if that particular expertise is something that we need to add to our team.

QUESTION: Kent Faulk, ``Birmingham News.''

What kinds of information are you collecting or have collected from Marshall, and does it include information about the launch and accident?

DITTEMORE: Let's see. From Marshall, predominantly, we're asking them to look at their subsystems, the major subsystems being the main engine, the solid rocket motor, the solid rocket booster--or the booster system that attaches to the motor--and then the external tank.

They're looking at all those major subsystems as methodically as we are looking at the orbiter here in Houston and other parts of the country, and we're pulling everything together as one team, and we will evaluate each of the major subsystems and try to determine if there is anything within that subsystem that would have contributed to the loss of ``Columbia.''

When we are sure that there is no information there that leads us to believe that that subsystem should be under suspicion, then we will declare that not to be a root cause and will--we will wrap that particular activity up and concentrate on those that are still in our pool of information, pool of discussion.

QUESTION: Ron, Garrett Sheehan, WAFF 48 News in Huntsville.

What kind of role Marshall played in the specific investigation that happened right after takeoff as far as the debris coming down from the external tank?

DITTEMORE: Well, two major areas.

One is film review. They have experts in film review that help us from flight to flight.

And because the project management for the external tank is located in--at the Marshall Space Flight Center, they were a major player in helping us understand the shedding of the debris, the makeup of the debris, its structure, its weight, how it would respond when it impacted the orbiter, et cetera.

So they were major players and helped us come to the conclusion that it wasn't a significant event.

HERRING: OK. We're done in Huntsville, and now standing by in Lufkin, Texas, we'll take some questions there. Try to limit it to five questions, please.

QUESTION: OK. This is Steven Yates (ph) with KRVA, KUEZ Radio in Lufkin.

We've been out in the field, and we have observed many of the debris on the ground, some of the 1,200-plus items of debris on the ground, with many law enforcement and volunteers guarding this debris, and with several school districts closed until the debris is removed. When do you anticipate the removal of the debris?

DITTEMORE: I don't have a particular time or date. We are working as fast as we can. We believe we have the right teams, the right individuals on the scene to help us identify, catalog, do the right environmental protection for both the people that are handling the debris and for those that live in the general area, and we're doing that cautiously but we're doing it as fast as reasonable to protect both the public and to protect the evidence.

And, I know that it may become some inconvenience to those in that general area and that's why at the beginning of this briefing I expressed my appreciation for those in the areas where the debris is heavily concentrated. We appreciate them very much for their patience, for their willingness to cooperate with us as we go through this difficult period.

But, we believe it is prudent for us to be safe. It is prudent for us to be cautious. It is prudent for us to protect the public. We do not want any individuals to be harmed in any way and so we're very cautious about it. I suspect that over the coming days we'll have a better handle on how to handle. We'll have a better idea on how to handle this debris that will expedite its pick up and arrival to our staging area. And so, if you can bear with us a little while longer, I think that any inconvenience will quickly come to an end.

QUESTION: This is Rich Opple (ph) with the ``New York Times'' in Lufkin. Can you say how many NASA officials you have in the field out here in East Texas, and has there been a mobilization within the agency of people normally in administrative or other jobs like that who are now involved in the recovery and locating the debris?

DITTEMORE: I estimate that we have over 100 NASA officials in the field. We have mobilized a number of folks both administrative, technical, engineering, and management from different field centers around the country to the staging area.

Our headquarters senior management is accompanying the accident investigation board to that area today and so it is a focal point for us and it is going to be a concentration of effort for the near term.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That's all the questions from Lufkin.

HERRING: Thank you. We're going to come back here. We have time for about three questions. Let me start with Gil on the front row here.

QUESTION: Gil Kamari (ph), Israeli Television, Channel 10. In the name of all the Israeli media our concern is did you find the remains of one astronaut, two astronauts, maybe more, and are we going to give access to the special representative of the IDF the Israeli Defense Forces is sending you to examine the remains and to decide if they are Ilan Ramon's?

CABANA: We found remains from all the astronauts. It's still in the process of identification and we're working closely with representatives of the Israeli government to ensure that everything is done properly.

RITA COSBY, FOX NEWS ANCHOR: Rita Cosby with FOX News Channel. Ron, in a lot of the commercial flights there was a big concern particularly about wiring. We've been talking a lot about wiring the last hour and a half, capped on wiring, arching, causing fire, sparking. There was even an issue with the shuttle fleet in 1999 where they had grounded the shuttle fleet with concern of wiring. How much is that a possibility, given the fact you're saying thermal not structural?

DITTEMORE: 102, or Columbia, was one of the vehicles that had recently come out of a long period of wiring inspection, intensive wiring inspection and not only did we repair the wire, replace wires that were not repairable, we put protective covering through much of the vehicle. And so, we're confident that from a wiring standpoint that issue is not going to be the root cause.

It's something other than wiring. We believe it's something other than wiring. An onboard fire would not at this point give us the indications that we have on the left side of the vehicle. And so, that's not something that we're concentrating on, nor does it look like it's going to be anything that would go into our pool of investigative items that we think might be a cause. We don't believe that's an issue.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE)

HERRING: I'm trying to find out if I'm going to have any information on that before we end the briefing here.

QUESTION: Carlos DeSalvo (ph) of the Associated Press for Ron. You mentioned earlier about the amateur video and photography you've gotten. Do you know at this point how much of that you received and what you have received how helpful has that been in trying to determine what happened to Columbia?

DITTEMORE: It's been helpful. We appreciate the public responding to our calls for information. Yesterday we received over 600 phone calls to our operations center here at the Johnson Space Center, and we received well over 200 e-mails. Half of the e-mails contained images and so the public has been very responsive in providing to us their information and all of that information is being poured over right now. We're looking at every piece of information.

We also have some reports, as I mentioned earlier, from the people on the West Coast who observed some events over California and Arizona, and we have written statements from them. We are talking with them on the phone.

If there are videos or still pictures, photographs that they have in their possession that they can allow us to have or e-mail to us, we are desirous to get that information and we are in contact with those that made the report on the West Coast and I believe we'll have that information today. We think that's important to us.

But just a wonderful turn out from the public just to help us gather information, and it's continuing to happen and we appreciate it.

HERRING: OK, just a couple of programming notes. First, there's no official word yet on a memorial service. I expect that fairly quickly before the day is over on details about that.

The next briefing just to give you guys an idea of the briefing schedule, we are now planning to have briefings twice a day beginning tomorrow, the next briefing scheduled for 11:30 a.m. Eastern time. That would be from NASA headquarters and then we would be back tomorrow at about the same time. We're targeting 3:30 Central, 4:30 Eastern time. Recognizing that these gentlemen are part of the meetings that are taking place twice a day, so we have to be a little flexible on the start times of our briefings.

Also, some of the words that Ron was passing on about the photographs and video that folks are finding or are able to provide to us, there is a phone number I'd like to pass on to you again as I did yesterday. That phone number is 281-483-3388. I know several news media, a lot of the news media, are helping us put that word out and that phone number out.

There's also an e-mail address for digital images and that e-mail address is columbiaimagesnasa.gov. That has been changed from the lengthy one that we provided for you yesterday so it would be helpful if you could use that.

There's also a physical address that folks can mail items to that are more lengthy such as video or non-electronic images, and that physical address is also showing on the screen for those watching NASA Television. The address is Emergency Operations Center, Mail Code JA17, and that's Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas 77058.

So, we'd appreciate your help with that, and again I'd like to thank both of these gentlemen for taking the time today and your patience for recognizing our time on this.

Thank you.